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ABSTRACT 
 
KATRINA ELLIOTT:  On the Nature of Objective Chance 
(Under the direction of Marc Lange) 
 
 Objective chances constrain rational credences.  If an agent believes the chance of 
rain tomorrow to be .7, then in the usual case, her credence in rain tomorrow ought to be 
.7.  But it is famously puzzling why our rational credences in outcomes are constrained 
by our beliefs about the chances of those outcomes.  My dissertation offers a novel 
explanation of this rational constraint.  I develop and defend a “non-reductive” theory of 
chance and show that my account is well-suited to explain why our beliefs about chances 
constrain our rational credences in outcomes.  Furthermore, my non-reductive theory can 
accommodate whatever probability distributions are posited by our best scientific and 
philosophical theories. 
 According to my non-reductive theory, chances neither reduce to nor supervene 
on any non-chance facts.  On my view, beliefs about chances constrain rational credences 
in outcomes not in virtue of what chances are made of, but in virtue of the explanatory 
role that chances play.  Beliefs about chances are beliefs about explanations of their 
outcomes.  The relationship between rational credences in outcomes and beliefs about 
their explanations underwrites the relationship between rational credences in outcomes 
and beliefs about their chances.             
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1.  Motivating a Non-Reductive Theory of Chance 
1.1. Introduction 
 Our world seems to be objectively chancy.  The chance of rolling a 1 with a fair, 
six-sided die is 1/6.  The chance that the air in this room will remain more or less evenly 
dispersed is extremely high.  The chance that a radioactive atom will decay during its 
half-life is .5.  Both our everyday investigations and our best scientific theories arguably 
suggest that chances are an objective feature of our world.1 
 But objective chances are puzzling.  For example, the objective chance that an 
event occurs seems importantly connected to its occurrence.  What does this connection 
amount to?  The chance that a quarter lands on heads when flipped is .5, and that chance 
value is importantly connected to the fact that roughly half the number of times I have 
flipped a quarter, it has landed on heads.  However, the objective chance that an event 
occurs seems to necessitate nothing at all about whether it occurs, or the frequency with 
which it occurs.2  It is possible for a quarter to land on heads every time it is flipped, or to 
never land on heads at all.   
 The common philosophical approach to answering this question (and a host of 
others) about the nature of objective chance is to argue that chance facts reduce to facts of 
                                                           
1 Objective chances are contrasted with “subjective” chances that merely express our (perhaps rational) 
degree of confidence in various states of affairs.  I will assume, without further argument, that there are 
objective chances with values equal to neither 0 nor 1 in the actual world. 
 
2 Bigelow, Collins, and Pargetter (1993) call this the “Basic Chance Principle” and argue that any theory of 
chance must respect it.  Whether a theory of chance must be consistent with the Basic Chance Principle is a 
question beyond the scope of this dissertation, but I will make the (hopefully uncontroversial) assumption 
that satisfying it is a virtue and violating it is a vice.   
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some other (less puzzling) kind.  Unfortunately, every well-known reductive theory of 
chance faces serious challenges.  A natural conclusion to draw from the apparent failure 
of reductive theories is that the correct philosophical theory of objective chance is non-
reductive: chance facts cannot be grounded in facts of any other kind.   
 However, apart from general philosophical worries about non-reductive theories, 
non-reductive philosophical theories of chance seem particularly unattractive.  One 
feature of objective chance that calls for explanation is that objective chances constrain 
rational credence.  If an agent believes, for example, that the objective chance of rain 
tomorrow is .7, then (in the usual case) her credence in rain ought to be .7.  But why?  
What is it about objective chance that compels such a tight connection between beliefs 
about the objective chance of an outcome and our rational expectations about the 
occurrence of that outcome?  Philosophers have supposed that non-reductive theories can 
give no illuminating answer to this question.  Accordingly, the philosophical literature on 
objective chance has largely neglected non-reductive theories.      
 Non-reductive theories deserve closer examination.  The aim of this dissertation is 
to provide two novel arguments for a non-reductive theory of chance.  First, I will argue 
that non-reductive theories can explain why objective chances constrain rational 
credences.  Furthermore, I will provide reasons to think that many reductive theories of 
chance cannot.   
 Second, by exploring the relationship between the “macro-properties” discovered 
by non-fundamental sciences and the “micro-properties” of fundamental physics, I will 
argue that there are objective synchronic chance distributions: distributions allowing that 
the chance now of some event now be neither zero nor one.  Non-reductive theories, 
  3 
unlike some reductive theories, are liberal enough to accommodate objective synchronic 
chances. 
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a comprehensive defense of a 
non-reductive theory of chance, though I conclude by considering some objections to my 
non-reductive theory and highlighting issues that require further investigation.   Non-
reductive theories have received such little attention in the philosophical literature on 
chance that more modest ambitions are in order.  My aim is to show that a non-reductive 
theory is able to provide illuminating answers to questions about the nature of chance, 
and that it enjoys prima facie advantages over its reductive competitors. 
 I begin this chapter by discussing and evaluating two prominent types of reductive 
theories.  In section 2, I address Humean frequency theories and argue that, surprisingly, 
Humean frequency theories seem unable to explain why objective chances constrain 
rational credence.  In section 3, I address causal propensity theories and argue that they 
cannot accommodate objective synchronic chances.  Finally, in section 4, I introduce my 
non-reductive theory of chance and note some of its theoretical advantages.   
 
1.2.  Humean Frequency Theories and the Principal Principle 
 One answer to the question of how chances are importantly connected to the 
occurrence of their outcomes is that chances metaphysically depend on the occurrence of 
their outcomes.  I call theories that endorse this answer “Humean frequency” theories 
because they typically entail that objective chances supervene on the Humean mosaic of 
local, natural (and non-chancy) properties.3  More strictly, all Humean frequency theories 
                                                           
3 Philosophers often use the label “frequentism” to refer to any theory of chance that reduces chances to 
frequencies, regardless of whether those frequencies are hypothetical or actual.  Von Mises (1928) and 
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entail that objective chances either reduce to, or (at least) partially supervene on4, the 
actual relative frequency with which their outcomes occur.5   
 The most significant objection unique to Humean frequency theories is that they 
deny that the chance value of an outcome is consistent with any relative frequency of that 
outcome.6  Consider the simple Humean frequency theory ARF: that chances are actual 
relative frequencies.  According to ARF, the chance that a coin lands heads is equal to .5 
if and only if the actual relative frequency with which that coin lands heads is equal to .5.  
Consequently, a fair coin must be tossed at least two times, and cannot be tossed an odd 
number of times!  Surely this result is too counterintuitive to accept. 
 More sophisticated Humean frequency theories face a similar, though admittedly 
less decisive, version of the problem.  According to David Lewis’s “Best System 
Account” (BSA) of objective chance, the chance at a time of some outcome is entailed by 
the best deductive system of truths and history-to-chance conditionals conjoined with the 
                                                           
Reichenbach (1949) endorsed views according to which objective chances are hypothetical long-run 
frequencies, and so are not Humean frequentists.  I do not include hypothetical frequentism in my 
discussion of reductive theories because I take the objections to it to be both decisive and irrelevant to the 
present discussion.  See Salmon (1967) for excellent reasons to reject hypothetical frequentism.     
 
4 The sense of supervene I have in mind is as follows: feature of the world x supervenes on feature of the 
world y if and only if x holds in every metaphysically possible world in which y holds.  Theories of chance 
according to which chances “partially” supervene on outcomes are those in which chances supervene on 
outcomes combined with some additional (non-chancy) feature(s) of the world, such as the Humean 
mosaic.   
 
5 Perhaps the name “Humean frequency” is poorly chosen, since someone could hold that chances are 
actual relative frequencies (and so be a Humean frequentist by my lights) but deny that actual relative 
frequencies supervene on the Humean mosaic (and so not be a Humean!).  I do intend for such a view to fit 
under the heading “Humean frequency theory”, even though there is nothing Humean about it.  
Nevertheless, the name is suggestive, since (to my knowledge) all Humean frequency views that have 
actually been endorsed are, in fact, Humean.     
 
6 As is well known, Humean frequency theories face many significant challenges, including the reference 
class problem.  But these challenges are not unique to Humean frequency theories.  I briefly discuss the 
reference class problem in Chapter 5. 
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(categorical) history of the world up to that time.7  A system counts as “best” exactly on 
the condition that it provides the optimal balance of simplicity, strength, and fit with the 
Humean mosaic.  Because a sacrifice in fit may be outweighed by a gain in simplicity, 
chances and actual relative frequencies may diverge on the BSA.   
 While the BSA improves on ARF by allowing that chance values differ from 
actual relative frequencies, it nevertheless denies that the chance value of an outcome is 
consistent with any relative frequency of that outcome.  Lewis himself pointed out this 
consequence of the BSA, which he refers to as “undermining”.  He writes, 
For instance, there is some minute present chance that far more tritium atoms will 
exist in the future than have existed hitherto, and each one of them will decay in 
only a few minutes.  If this unlikely future came to pass, presumably it would 
complete a chancemaking pattern on which the half-life of tritium would be very 
much less than the actual 12.26 years.  Certainly that’s so under simple 
frequentism, and most likely its so under the best-system analysis as well.  Could 
it come to pass, given the present chances?  Well, yes and no.  It could, in the 
sense that there’s a non-zero present chance of it.  It couldn’t, in the sense that its 
coming to pass contradicts the truth about present chances. (Lewis 1994: 482) 
 
According to the BSA, it is not true that the chance value of an outcome is consistent 
with any relative frequency of that outcome, since it is possible for the low (but non-zero) 
chance of an outcome to be inconsistent with the occurrence of that outcome.   
 It seems to me that any plausible Humean frequency theory will have an 
undermining problem, and I consider this to be a significant cost.8  If chances 
metaphysically depend (in any reasonable way) on the occurrence of their outcomes, then 
it is not the case that the chance value of an outcome is consistent with any actual relative 
                                                           
7 Lewis (1994) 
 
8 Lewis did not consider undermining alone to be more than a “peculiarity”.  Instead, he worried that, 
because of undermining, the BSA and the Principal Principle entail a contradiction.  I take undermining to 
be an unattractive consequence, regardless of whether it leads to inconsistency. 
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frequency of that outcome.  Costs, however, can be outweighed, and Humean frequency 
theories purportedly provide a very weighty benefit. 
 To paraphrase Bishop Butler, chances are the very guide to life; ordinarily, an 
agent’s beliefs about the objective chances of various outcomes determine her rational 
credences in those outcomes.9  David Lewis famously offered a codification of the 
relationship between chance and rational credence.  Roughly, Lewis’s principle states 
that if a rational agent believes some outcome to have a given chance of occurring, then 
her credence in that outcome is equal to that chance.  For example, if I believe that the 
chance of rain tomorrow is .9, my credence in rain tomorrow (if I am rational) is .9.   
 The principle holds with one exception.  A reliable crystal ball might predict that 
that there will be no rain tomorrow despite there now being a high chance that it will rain 
tomorrow.  If I believe that the crystal ball is reliable, I should put in my lot with the 
ball’s prediction and not set my credence to what I believe the current chance of rain to 
be.  Reliable crystal balls, time travelers, and oracles are all examples of ways to acquire 
a kind of information about future outcomes that, to use Lewis’s metaphor, does not “go 
by way of” the chances of those outcomes.  Every such case (where an agent ought to 
ignore the chances when forming her credences), argued Lewis, is one in which the agent 
has access to such “inadmissible” information.10             
 Lewis named his formulation the “Principal Principle” (henceforth “PP”) since it 
describes an essential feature of objective chance and argued that any adequate theory of 
chance must explain why we ought to form our credences in accord with the PP.  Not 
                                                           
9 Butler (1736)  
 
10 Lewis (1986)    
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surprisingly, Lewis believed that a Humean frequency theory of chance could meet this 
burden.  He writes, “I think I see dimly, but clearly enough, how knowledge of 
frequencies and symmetries and best systems could constrain rational credence.”11  
 Lewis’s thought, roughly speaking, is that if chances supervene on what actually 
happens (as far as facts not involving chances are concerned), then it is not entirely 
mysterious why one’s opinions about chances should constrain one’s expectations about 
what actually happens- including the outcomes of chance processes.   
 But it is not at all obvious that Lewis’s optimism is warranted.  Humean 
frequency theories seem to require an appeal to the PP in any explanation they give of the 
PP.  While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to demonstrate that no Humean 
frequency theory of chance is able to provide a non-circular explanation of the PP, a 
quick example illustrates the worry.   
 Return to our simple theory ARF: that chances are actual relative frequencies.  
ARF should (if Lewis is correct) at least show promise of grounding the PP.  After all, 
the connection between chances and outcomes is very tight indeed if the chance that a 
coin lands heads just is the frequency with which that coin actually lands heads.  But the 
prospects for an explanation dim when we examine more carefully how the PP would 
have to be explained.   
 Suppose an agent is certain that the chance of her coin landing heads is .5.  If 
ARF is correct, then the actual relative frequency with which her coin lands heads is .5.  
Why, given this fact, ought her credence that the next flip lands heads be .5?  One answer 
might be that if she sets her credence in accord with the actual relative frequency over a 
sufficiently long series of tosses, then she is likely to do better than if she sets her 
                                                           
11 Lewis (1994) 
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credence to some other value.12  Of course, she is not guaranteed to do better.  She might 
get unlucky and make all of her predictions during a long string of tosses that land on 
heads.  (In that case, she would have done better to expect with certainty that the coin 
lands heads.)  But since the actual relative frequency of heads is .5, that is unlikely to 
happen. 
 So far, every step in this explanation of the PP is correct.  If ARF is true, then an 
agent who obeys the PP is likely to make better predictions than one who does not.  But 
what does it matter that an agent is likely to make good predictions?  The answer is that if 
we believe she is likely to make good predictions, we can rationally expect that she make 
good predictions.  But the inference from what we believe has a high chance to what 
credence we assign requires an application of the PP!  Unless we have already assumed 
the PP, the result that the agent is likely to do well if she obeys the PP is no help. 
 Humean frequency theories do a good job of explaining why chance values and 
actual outcomes line up in some way, since on these views the latter (along with the rest 
of the Humean mosaic, perhaps) determine the former.  But, because of the circularity 
worry, it is not clear that this represents much progress toward grounding the PP. 
 In Chapters 2 and 3, I provide an explanation of the PP that is very different from 
the one Lewis thought he dimly saw.  Strictly speaking, my explanation of the PP is 
neutral with respect to what, if anything, chances reduce to.  But my explanation does 
require that, if anything in the world corresponds to our concept CHANCE, then objective 
chances (in the usual case) explain the occurrence of their outcomes.  Humean frequency 
                                                           
12 The sense in which she is likely to “do better” is that she is likely to score higher according to some 
scoring rule that rewards agents for having high credences in outcomes that occur and low credences in 
outcomes that do not occur.  On any standard scoring rule, our agent is likely to score higher if her 
credences equal the actual relative frequencies than if her credences do not.  See Winkler (1969) for a 
discussion of scoring rules.  
  9 
theories have a prima facie difficulty allowing that chances are explanatory.  Consider 
ARF again.  If chances are actual relative frequencies, then it does not seem that chances 
explain their outcomes.  Actual relative frequencies are just summaries of outcomes, and 
summaries of outcomes are not (at least prima facie) explanations of those outcomes.  
Any theory of chance according to which chances reduce, at least in part, to facts about 
actual outcomes (as on Lewis’s Best System Account) faces the same difficulty that ARF 
does.  If the outcomes help to constitute the chances, then the chances are ill placed to 
explain the outcomes.13 
 The cost of adopting a Humean frequency theory of chance is that we must live 
with the undermining problem.  The benefit, according to Lewis, is that we will have an 
explanation of the PP.  I agree that explaining the PP is indeed a significant benefit, but I 
doubt that it is provided by Humean frequency theories.   
 
1.3.  Causal Propensity Theories 
 A different answer to the question of how chances are importantly connected to 
the occurrence of their outcomes is that chances are a causal propensity, or tendency, of 
some physical state of affairs to produce outcomes.  I call theories that endorse this 
answer “causal propensity” theories.14   
                                                           
13 It is worth making explicit that my complaint against Humean frequency theories is not that they fail to 
explain why chances explain their outcomes.  As I discuss more in Chapter 5, I doubt that there can be an 
explanation of the explanatory role that objective chance plays that does not make some irreducible 
reference to chancy facts or concepts.  Rather, my worry is that chances are not explanations of their 
outcomes according to Humean frequency theories.  As Fred Dretske (1977) says (when making a similar 
complaint against Humean accounts of laws of nature), you cannot make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear.  
You cannot make explanations of outcomes out of those very outcomes.  
 
14 Not every propensity theory is a causal propensity theory.  Some philosophers deny that chances are 
causal propensities.  I address such theories in footnote 23.  Other philosophers identify chances with 
  10 
 While I leave the task of providing a full explication of causal propensities to the 
causal propensity theorist, a few introductory remarks will clarify the class of views I 
have in mind.  First, propensities, like dispositions, do not entail the occurrence of their 
manifestations.  For example, solubility is the dispositional property to dissolve in water, 
but a salt sample may be soluble even though it never dissolves (since it is never placed 
in water).  Similarly, a fair coin may have a propensity to land on heads when flipped 
even though it never lands on heads (since it is never flipped).15 
 Second, propensities differ from “surefire” dispositions.  Roughly, a surefire 
disposition is manifested so long as its manifestation conditions are met.  Solubility is a 
surefire disposition of salt, for example, since salt dissolves so long as it is placed in 
water (provided that being placed in water is solubility’s only manifestation condition).  
Propensities, on the other hand, need not be manifested even though their manifestation 
conditions are met.  In this respect, it is helpful to think of propensities as tendencies.  I 
have a tendency to misplace my keys when I am tired or distracted.  Nevertheless, 
sometimes I am tired and distracted but do not misplace my keys.  Similarly, a fair coin 
may have a propensity to land on heads when flipped even though it actually lands on 
tails.  Furthermore, propensities, like tendencies, come in degrees.  My tendency to 
misplace my keys is much stronger when I am tired or distracted than it is when I am 
                                                           
propensities to produce relative frequencies of outcomes, rather than individual outcomes.  I address these 
theories in footnote 22. 
 
15 For ease of exposition, I suppose that the propensity associated with the chance that a coin lands heads 
when flipped is a property of the coin alone.  Sophisticated causal propensity theorists deny that claim, and 
instead see propensities as properties of “chance setups” (Popper (1959) and Fetzer (1981)) or of entire 
world states at a time (Miller (1994)).  This complexity does not become relevant for our purposes until we 
examine David Miller’s defense of causal propensity theories, at which point I make it explicit.   
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rested and focused.  Chance values measure the strength of propensities.  A fair coin’s 
propensity to land on heads is just as strong as its propensity to land on tails.16 
 Because of these two features of propensities, causal propensity theories have an 
advantage over Humean frequency theories.  Unlike ARF, causal propensity theories do 
not entail that all fair coins are flipped (since the presence of a propensity does not entail 
that its manifestation conditions are met).  And, unlike the BSA, causal propensity 
theories do not have an undermining problem.  Even strong causal propensities can fail to 
manifest themselves (though their manifestation conditions are met), and unlikely actual 
relative frequencies are the results of such repeated failures.  However, causal 
propensities theories purportedly face their own problems. 
 Chances are probabilities, and so must obey the probability calculus.17  If chances 
are associated with causal propensities, however, it seems that they violate the calculus.18  
To borrow a particularly vivid illustration of the problem from Wesley Salmon, let “P” 
be that I am shot in the head and let “Q” be that I die from a gunshot wound.  It seems 
that a causal propensity theorist must interpret the probability of P conditional on Q as a 
measure of the causal tendency that my being shot in the head has to produce my dying 
from a gunshot wound.   
 So far so good, but (thanks to a consequence of the probability calculus called  
“Bayes’s theorem”) if the probability of P conditional on Q is defined, so too (in the 
                                                           
16 Chance values only measure causal tendencies according to propensity views that identify chances with 
the causal propensity to produce a particular outcome, rather than to produce frequencies of outcomes. 
 
17 By “the” probability calculus, I have in mind Kolmogorov’s calculus (1933).  For a much more thorough 
discussion of the relationship between propensity theories and various probability calculi, see Gillies 
(2000). 
 
18 Salmon first published an argument for this conclusion, but he attributed it to Paul Humphreys. See 
Salmon (1979).   
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usual case) is the probability of Q conditional on P.  But the probability of Q conditional 
on P cannot be a measure of a causal propensity, since my dying of a gunshot wound has 
no causal tendency to produce my having been shot.  Because causes are temporally 
asymmetric, causal propensities cannot provide an interpretation of every “inversion” of 
conditional probabilities that the probability calculus defines.  So, causal propensities are 
not probabilities, and thus are not chances.   
 David Miller has offered a response to this objection on behalf of the causal 
propensity theorist.19  According to Miller, the objection goes wrong in assuming that 
propensities measure a causal relationship between events P and Q.  For Miller, the 
causal propensity theorist should interpreted the probability of P conditional on Q as a 
measure of the causal tendency of the world now to produce the outcome that I die of a 
gunshot wound given that the world now will be one in which I am shot in the head.  
Similarly, the probability of Q conditional on P is a measure of the causal tendency of the 
world now to produce the outcome that I am shot in the head given that the world now 
will be one in which I die of a gunshot wound.   
 I am happy to grant that the causal propensity theorist has no difficulty providing 
a theory of chance that satisfies the probability calculus, either for Miller’s reasons or 
others.20  However, Miller’s response highlights a different problem for the causal 
propensity theorist that is, by my lights, more damning. 
 Consider the chance that some well-shuffled deck has a spade as its top card.  
Intuitively, the value of this chance is .25.  So, it seems that the chance now that a well-
shuffled deck has a spade as its top card now is .25.  But this chance cannot be thought of 
                                                           
19 Miller (1994) 
 
20 Fetzer (1981) and Gillies (2000) offer different responses to the objection. 
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as a causal propensity, even on Miller’s view.  The world now does not have a causal 
tendency to produce any states of affairs that obtain now.  The world now can only have a 
causal tendency to produce future states of affairs.21  Let a chance be “synchronic” if and 
only if it has a non-extremal value and is the chance at a time that some state of affairs 
obtains at that time.  Causal propensity theories rule out the existence of objective 
synchronic chances. 
 The probability calculus does not entail that there are objective synchronic 
chances, and so a failure to accommodate them is not a failure to provide an 
interpretation of the probability calculus.  Furthermore, one might reasonably doubt that 
there are synchronic chances.  Isn’t the sense in which there is a .25 chance now that a 
well-shuffled deck has a spade as its top card now merely subjective?  Since all we know 
about the deck is that it is well-shuffled, our present degree of confidence that the top 
card is a spade should be .25.  But this does not show that there is a non-extremal 
objective chance now that the top card is a spade now.  Either the top card is a spade right 
now (in which case the relevant objective chance now is 1), or the top card isn’t a spade 
right now (in which case the relevant objective chance now is 0).  So it may seem as if all 
synchronic chances are merely subjective expressions of our ignorance.   
 These considerations notwithstanding, in Chapter 4 I give an argument that there 
are objective synchronic chances.  If that argument is correct, causal propensity theories 
are an unsatisfactory theory of objective chance, since they wrongly suppose that all 
objective chances are causal propensities. 
 Can causal propensity theories explain the Principal Principle?  That depends.  
Causal propensity theories can allow that chances are causal explanations of their 
                                                           
21 At least, so long as there is no backwards causation. 
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outcomes.  If objective chances are (in the usual case) causal explanations of their 
outcomes, then the causal propensity theorist can help herself to my explanation of the 
PP.22 However, in Chapter 4, I argue that synchronic chances are non-causal explanations 
of their outcomes.  If that argument is right, then causal propensity theories cannot 
explain why synchronic chances obey the PP.23 
 
1.4. A Non-Reductive Theory of Chance 
 Humean frequency theories fail because chances do not behave like actual relative 
frequencies do, and causal propensity theories fail because chances do not behave like 
causal propensities do.  The inescapable problem that reductive theories face is that 
chance facts do not seem to behave like any other kind of fact.  The only theory that can 
correctly capture all the features of objective chance is non-reductive; I maintain that 
chance facts neither reduce to nor supervene on any non-chance facts.   
 I am not the first philosopher to adopt a non-reductive theory of chance in 
response to the difficulties facing reductive theories.  For example, Elliott Sober writes, 
In view of the failures of these [reductive] interpretations, my preference is to 
adopt a [non-reductive] theory of probability, which asserts that objective 
probability is not reducible to anything else.  Frequencies provide evidence about 
                                                           
22 Someone might maintain that objective chances are causal propensities to produce long run frequencies, 
rather than to produce particular outcomes.  (This does not count as a causal propensity theory on my 
taxonomy.)  Presumably this is the view expressed in Popper (1959).  It is not clear to me that such a view 
could use my explanation of the PP (even apart from worries about synchronic chances), since it seems to 
deny that chances are explanations of particular outcomes.   
 
23 Some propensity theorists, such as Gillies (2000), deny that propensities are causal.  Can non-causal 
propensity theorists use my explanation of the PP?  Since Gillies holds that chances are propensities to 
produce long run frequencies, I doubt that his view can.  (See footnote 22.)  However, a non-causal 
propensity theorist who holds that chances are propensities to produce individual outcomes- and believes 
that propensities are explanatory but needn’t be casual- could use my explanation of the PP.  Furthermore, 
she could admit the existence of synchronic chances!  However, it is not clear to me that this view is 
substantively different from the non-reductive theory I endorse.  Reducing chances to explanatory, non-
causal dispositions to produce particular outcomes does not strike me as much of a reduction.   
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the values of probabilities, and probabilities make (probabilistic) predictions 
about frequencies, but probabilities don’t reduce to frequencies… Instead, we 
should view objective probabilities as theoretical quantities. (Sober 2010: 151) 
 
I agree with Sober (and reductive theorists such as Von Mises and Gilles) that objective 
chances are theoretical quantities.  Furthermore, I think that the analogies (and 
disanalogies) between chance and other theoretical quantities are particularly 
illuminating.   
 Inertial mass, for example, is a theoretical quantity governed by Newton’s second 
law of motion.  Inertial mass plays an important explanatory role in Newtonian physics.24  
For example, a body’s inertial mass explains its rate of acceleration when acted on by a 
fixed force, and that bodies have different inertial masses explains why some bodies are 
more resistant to acceleration than others.   
 But the particular explanatory role that inertial mass plays is contingent.25  Had 
the laws of motion been sufficiently different, the fact that a body’s inertial mass is m 
would explain relationships between force and acceleration that differ from those 
relationships that m actually explains.  Because of this contingency, we might deny that 
the inertial mass of a body, by itself, explains the relationships between force and 
acceleration.  Instead, we might insist that the relationship between the force acting on a 
body and its rate of acceleration is explained by the inertial mass of that body combined 
with the fact that it is a law of nature that F=ma. 
 On my view, objective chance, like inertial mass, plays an important explanatory 
role in our best scientific theories.  For example, the objective chance that a gas will 
                                                           
24 Let’s suppose, for ease of exposition, that Newton’s second law is a law in the actual world. 
 
25 Essentialists about natural kinds will not agree that there are metaphysically possible worlds in which 
inertial mass is governed by laws of nature that differ from the actual world, but I’ll ignore this 
complication for now and return to it in Chapter 5. 
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expand to fill its container explains why the gas expands if it does.  But objective chance, 
unlike inertial mass, plays its explanatory role essentially.  The objective chance that a 
gas will expand to fill its container explains the exact same event (type) in every 
metaphysically possible world: it explains the gas expanding to fill its container if it does.  
Accordingly, we do not need to combine the chance of an outcome with anything else 
(including laws of nature) to have an explanation of the occurrence of that outcome.                   
 How, then, are objective chances importantly connected to the occurrence of their 
outcomes?  My answer is that objective chances are essentially explanations of the 
occurrence of their outcomes.  Notice that I do not claim that objective chances are 
essentially causal explanations of their outcomes.  Though some philosophers hold that 
all genuine explanations are causal explanations, I do not.26  Furthermore, I do not 
require that only high chance values explain the occurrence of their outcomes.  Low 
objective chance values, on my view, are just as explanatory as are high objective chance 
values.     
 Unlike Humean frequency theories, my non-reductive theory does not suffer from 
an undermining problem.  On my view, the chance of an outcome is consistent with any 
actual relative frequency of that outcome.  Long runs of unlikely outcomes can occur, 
and when they do they are explained by the small chance of their occurrence.  And, 
unlike causal propensity theories, my view does not rule out objective synchronic 
chances.  So long as objective synchronic chances are explanations of their outcomes, my 
                                                           
26 It is worth making explicit that someone could hold that chance facts do not reduce to facts of any other 
kind and that chances are essentially causal explanations.  In other words, it is the argument in Chapter 4, 
and not my commitment to a non-reductive theory of chance, that leads me to conclude that chances are not 
essentially causal explanations.  
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non-reductive theory can accommodate them.  In at least these respects, my non-
reductive theory is an improvement on its reductive competitors. 
 While philosophers have acknowledged that non-reductive theories have certain 
advantages, most have supposed that no non-reductive theory of chance can ground the 
Principal Principle.  For example, Lewis writes,  
Be my guest-posit all the primitive unHumean whatnots you like. (I only ask that 
your alleged truths should supervene on being.) But play fair in naming your 
whatnots.  Don't call any alleged feature of reality "chance" unless you've  already 
shown that you have something, knowledge of which could constrain rational 
credence… I don't begin to see, for instance, how knowledge that two universals 
stand in a certain special relation N* could constrain rational credence about the 
future coinstantiation of those universals. (Lewis 1994: 484) 
 
If it is doubtful that a non-Humean theory of chance can explain the PP, a non-reductive 
theory’s prospects are even worse.  If chance facts do not reduce to other kinds of facts 
(for which there are independent accounts), we seem left with few resources with which 
to explain the PP.   
 However, this disadvantage is merely apparent.  In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that 
beliefs about chances constrain rational credences in outcomes not in virtue of what 
chances are made of, but in virtue of the explanatory role that chances play.  I will argue 
that beliefs about chances are beliefs about explanations of their outcomes.  The 
relationship between rational credences in outcomes and beliefs about their explanations 
underwrites the relationship between rational credences in outcomes and beliefs about 
their chances.  My non-reductive theory, on which chances are essentially explanations of 
their outcomes, is uniquely well suited to employ this explanation of the Principal 
Principle.  
2. SWAMPING 
2.1. Introduction 
   Explaining the Principal Principle is complicated by the fact that it has two 
distinct aspects that call for explanation.  The first is the particular quantitative 
relationship it describes between a rational agent’s credences regarding the chances of 
various outcomes and her credences in those outcomes.  If a rational agent is certain that 
the chance of some outcome is n (a real number between 0 and 1 inclusive), then her 
credence in that outcome is equal to n (so long as she has no “inadmissible” information).  
But why does rationality require that the values be equal?  Why is an agent not allowed 
to have a credence that is merely near n?  Why, for that matter, ought an agent to be more 
confident in an outcome the higher its chance rather than the lower its chance?     
 A second aspect of the PP that calls for explanation is that a rational agent’s 
credences in the chance of an outcome, unlike her credences in other evidence about that 
outcome, determine her rational credence in that outcome.  There is no particular opinion 
about rain, for example, that I am rationally obliged to have if I am confident that there 
has been a change in atmospheric pressure, that there are heavy storms clouds, or even 
that I seen rain approaching.  But my opinions about the chance of rain (if I have any 
such opinions) rationally compel me to have a very particular credence that it rains.27 
                                                           
27 Swamping and the PP apply not only to cases where an agent is certain of the chance of an outcome, but 
also to cases where she merely has various opinions about the chance of that outcome (i.e. her credence is 
.4 that the current chance of rain tomorrow is .7 and her credence is .6 that the current chance of rain 
tomorrow is .5).  In such a case, her rational credence in an outcome is determined by a weighting of her 
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According to the PP, a rational agent’s credences in an outcome’s chance “swamp” all of 
her other (admissible) evidence about that outcome.  I call this aspect “SWAMPING”:28   
  
 SWAMPING:  A rational agent’s credences in the chance of an outcome determine 
 her credence in that outcome, so long as she only has admissible information. 
  
 The important point is that we can wonder not only why PP’s particular 
quantitative relationship obtains, but also why rational credences in chances determine 
rational credences in outcomes in any way at all.  In this chapter, I provide an explanation 
of SWAMPING that does not explain the PP’s particular quantitative relationship: 
elsewhere I provide an explanation of that quantitative relationship that presupposes 
SWAMPING.29    
 I will argue that an agent’s rational opinions about what I call “hypothetical 
explanations” swamp her other (admissible) evidence in precisely the way that an agent’s 
rational opinions about chances swamp her other (admissible) evidence.  If rational 
opinions about chances involve rational opinions about hypothetical explanations, then 
SWAMPING is merely a special instance of a broader principle that relates rational opinions 
regarding hypothetical explanations with rational opinions regarding what they explain.  I 
call this principle the “Hypothetical Explanation-Credence Principle” (HCP).   
 On my view, SWAMPING holds not because of what chances are made of (as on a 
reductive account), but rather because of the explanatory role they essentially play.  A 
                                                           
opinions about the chance of that outcome (see footnote 49).  For ease of exposition, I use “credence” and 
“opinion” interchangeably throughout this essay.   
 
28 “SWAMPING” is to be distinguished from the Bayesian idea of “the swamping of the priors” in which 
agents with different priors converge on the same credences given enough shared evidence.  That said, the 
flavor of the two phenomena is similar (hence the shared name) in that both involve some evidence 
rendering some credences irrelevant.   
 
29 See Chapter 3. 
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non-reductive theory’s prospects for grounding SWAMPING, then, are not at all bleak.  The 
strategy I pursue for explaining SWAMPING relies on the relation between rational 
opinions about chances and rational opinions about hypothetical explanations.  To secure 
this connection, a theory of chance does not need to reduce chances to something else.  
Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 1, such a reduction would only tend to get in the way.  
 I will contend that HCP, like SWAMPING, applies only to cases where a rational 
agent has no inadmissible information. In section 2, I consider cases where a rational 
agent’s opinions about hypothetical explanations swamp her other evidence, and cases 
where they do not.  These cases do double duty:  they motivate HCP by illustrating the 
kind of case to which it applies, and they also motivate a novel account of admissibility 
by illustrating the kind of case to which HCP does not apply.  In section 3, I draw from 
these cases to develop my account of admissibility and to formulate HCP. 
 My strategy for explaining SWAMPING is to consider the special case of HCP 
where a rational agent regards an outcome’s chance as a hypothetical explanation of that 
outcome.  But this kind of case suggests an apparent counterexample to HCP.  In section 
4, I discuss this candidate counterexample and argue that it is no threat to HCP because 
the rational agent in the example has inadmissible information. 
 In section 5, I explain how SWAMPING follows from HCP if rational agents regard 
chances of outcomes to be hypothetical explanations of those outcomes.  I provide some 
reasons to think that (in the usual case where chances are the guide to life) rational agents 
regard chances as hypothetical explanations.        
 We can make significant progress toward explaining the PP by recognizing the 
explanatory role that chances play and by regarding SWAMPING as a special instance of 
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HCP.  This strategy is most naturally available for non-reductive theories, making them 
among the most promising theories of chance.         
 
2.2.  Motivating Cases 
 Suppose that some rational agent is considering whether I will get a cold.  In 
general, there are lots of different types of evidence that the agent might acquire about 
my health.  She might hear from a friend that I am sick, for example, or find a box of 
tissues in my office.  But if she is trying to predict whether or not I will be sick in the 
future, she will (typically) not have access to such sources of evidence.   
 Instead, she will likely base her prediction on evidence that she believes would 
have an explanatory relation to the cold I may get.30  Suppose that our agent believes that 
my lack of vitamin C coupled with some further facts about the relation between my 
vitamin C deficiency and my cold would explain my cold.  In that case, her confidence 
that I have a vitamin C deficiency will have some influence over her confidence that I 
will come down with a cold.  
 For ease of discussion, I will drop reference to the further facts the agent regards 
as part of the explanation of my cold, and write as if she considers my vitamin C 
deficiency alone to be sufficient to explain my cold.  This is purely shorthand.  She 
                                                           
30 It is notoriously difficult to give an analysis of “explanation” that is neither too restrictive nor too broad.  
I suspect that most of us think that an explanation is something more than merely a socially acceptable 
answer to a “why” question, but less than a complete list of all causally or nomologically relevant 
information such as Peter Railton’s (1978) “ideal explanatory text”.  I do not think this imprecision is a 
problem for my purposes since I am interested in the belief that some proposition is an explanation, 
regardless of whether that belief is true.  That we have such beliefs seems obvious, even if we are not able 
to articulate precisely what these beliefs must involve. 
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believes that my vitamin C deficiency, coupled with some connection between my 
vitamin C deficiency and my cold, would explain my cold.31    
 Of course, our rational agent need not believe that a lack of vitamin C actually 
explains my cold in order for her confidence in the former to influence her confidence in 
the latter.  The fact that P explains Q (at least on one common reading of “explains”) 
entails that P and Q obtain, but our agent might be less than certain that I am vitamin C 
deficient or that I get a cold.  For her confidence that I get a cold to be constrained by her 
confidence that I have a vitamin C deficiency, she need only believe that if it is true that I 
have a vitamin C deficiency and if it is true that I get a cold, then my vitamin C 
deficiency explains my cold.  In other words, it is enough that she believes that my 
vitamin C deficiency is a “hypothetical explanation” of my cold: 
 Hypothetical Explanation:  For hypothetical states of affairs X and P, an agent 
 believes X to be a “hypothetical explanation” of P to the degree to which she 
 believes that X suffices to explain P if X and P obtain.32   
 
 Suppose our rational agent is certain that I have a vitamin C deficiency and that 
my vitamin C deficiency is a hypothetical explanation of my cold.  Further suppose that 
her credence that I get a cold is .7.33  What happens to this credence if she becomes 
certain that I hate citrus fruit?34  Even though she regards this new information as having 
                                                           
31 We need not specify what precisely these further facts are.  They might be a law-like relation between 
my vitamin C deficiency and my cold, or the chance of having a cold given a vitamin C deficiency, or some 
further type of connection between my vitamin C level and my cold. 
 
32 The conditional that is the content of the agent’s belief is an indicative conditional, not a material 
conditional.   
 
33 This chapter leaves open the question of why an agent’s credence that some state of affairs obtains, 
given what she believes about a hypothetical explanation, should be one value rather than another.  To 
answer that question is to start an explanation of the particular quantitative relation codified by the PP (see 
section 1).  The content of the hypothetical explanation, including the details that I shall be omitting for 
ease of discussion (see footnote 34), must be what ultimately makes the requisite credence .7.       
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some explanatory relation to my catching a cold (after all, she is certain that my vitamin 
C deficiency is a hypothetical explanation of my cold), her confidence that I get a cold 
does not change.  The new information that I hate citrus fruit is only a hypothetical 
explanation of my cold, for our agent, in virtue of being a hypothetical explanation of my 
vitamin C deficiency.  Since our rational agent is already certain of a state of affairs that 
she is certain is a hypothetical explanation of my cold, acquiring the additional 
explanatory information that I hate citrus fruit makes no difference to her credence that I 
get a cold.35  
 This case is the germ of the Hypothetical Explanation-Credence Principle, and 
ultimately of my account of SWAMPING: so long as a rational agent has only admissible 
information, her opinions about states of affairs that she is certain are hypothetical 
explanations swamp her other admissible evidence in the same way that her opinions 
about chances swamp her other admissible evidence.  All we would need to arrive at 
SWAMPING, then, is that a rational agent regards an outcome’s chance as a hypothetical 
explanation of that outcome.    
 However, there are cases where our agent does alter her credence that I get a cold 
when she learns that I hate citrus fruit.  If she is unsure about my vitamin C levels, then 
she might become more confident that I have a vitamin C deficiency from learning that I 
hate citrus fruit, which in turn might make her more confident that I get a cold.  But if she 
                                                           
34 Here I assume that the agent has a great deal of familiar background information such as that citrus fruit 
has vitamin C, that people who hate things rarely eat them, and that the only connection between my hating 
citrus fruit and my cold goes by way of my vitamin C levels.   
 
35 I will later consider cases where acquiring additional explanatory information does make a difference to 
her rational credence in P.  In particular, cases in which the new information is about hypothetical states of 
affairs that occur in a causal chain between X and P are considered in section 4. 
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is already certain that I am vitamin C deficient, then learning that I hate citrus fruit makes 
no difference.36 
 Likewise, suppose our rational agent believes that the gene responsible for a 
hatred of citrus fruit is also responsible for producing a chemical that interferes with the 
human immune system.  That is, she believes that my hatred of citrus fruit not only 
influences my cold via a causal chain through my vitamin C deficiency, but also via a 
separate chain through my damaged immune system.  If she were to have such beliefs, 
then she might increase her credence that I will catch a cold when she learns that I hate 
citrus fruit.  But in such a case, she would not have been certain that my vitamin C 
deficiency is a hypothetical explanation of my cold.  Instead, she would have considered 
it possible that my vitamin C deficiency combined with the further “risk factor” that I 
have a gene that weakens my immune system is a hypothetical explanation of my cold.     
 A similar phenomenon appears when we consider a second rational agent.  
Suppose that our first rational agent has no opinions that bear on whether I get a cold 
other than her certainty that I have a vitamin C deficiency, that my vitamin C deficiency 
is a hypothetical explanation of my cold, and that I hate citrus fruit.  Suppose that the 
second rational agent is just like the first except that she has no confidence that I hate 
citrus fruit.  If the first agent’s credence that I get a cold is .7, then the second agent’s 
credence that I get a cold is also .7.  Even though they disagree about some information 
that they agree is hypothetically explanatory (since only one of them knows that I hate 
citrus fruit), this disagreement makes no difference to their credences that I get a cold.   
                                                           
36 As I discuss in footnote 49, certainty is actually a stronger requirement than is needed to rule out this sort 
of scenario.   
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 Again, there are cases in which these agents might differ in their credence that I 
get a cold- for example, if they disagree about whether I have a vitamin C deficiency or 
about whether a vitamin C deficiency is a hypothetical explanation of my cold.  But so 
long as both agents are certain that I have a vitamin C deficiency and certain that my 
vitamin C deficiency is a hypothetical explanation of my cold, their credences that I get a 
cold are the same despite their disagreement about whether I hate citrus fruit. 
 So far we have seen some cases where information that a rational agent takes to 
be a hypothetical explanation of P makes no difference to her credence in P if she is 
already certain that some further hypothetical state of affairs X obtains and that X is a 
hypothetical explanation of P.  But there are also important cases where additional 
explanatory information does make a difference to a rational agent’s credence in P, even 
when she is certain that X obtains and that X hypothetically explains P.    
 Consider a variation on our earlier example.  As before, suppose that a rational 
agent is considering whether I get a cold, she is certain that I have a vitamin C deficiency 
and that my vitamin C deficiency is a hypothetical explanation of my cold, and her 
credence that I get a cold is .7.  Now also suppose that she is certain of a disjunction: 
either I do not hate citrus fruit or I will not get a cold.  What happens to her credence that 
I get a cold if she learns that I hate citrus fruit?  As in the earlier example, the agent takes 
my hating citrus fruit to be part of a hypothetical explanation of my getting a cold.  But 
unlike the earlier example, her credence that I get a cold does change when she learns 
that I hate citrus fruit, since she then infers that I do not get a cold.  So there are some 
cases where, if a rational agent is certain that X and that X hypothetically explains P, new 
hypothetically explanatory information does make a difference to her credence in P.   
  26 
 The same range of possibilities exists when the new information is not 
hypothetically explanatory.  Suppose that a rational agent, who is certain that I have a 
vitamin C deficiency and that my vitamin C deficiency is a hypothetical explanation of 
my cold, becomes certain that I have frequent nosebleeds.  Further suppose that she has 
some confidence that my nosebleeds are a side effect of my vitamin C deficiency, though 
she is certain that my nosebleeds bear no explanatory relation to my cold.  Even though 
she takes my nosebleeds to be evidence of my getting a cold, her credence that I get a 
cold does not change when she becomes certain that I have frequent nosebleeds (since 
she is already certain that I have a vitamin C deficiency).  Furthermore, her credence that 
I get a cold does not change if she learns some information that she takes to be totally 
irrelevant (explanatorily and otherwise) to my getting a cold.  Her credence that I get a 
cold does not change when she learns that my dog is black, for example, provided that 
she is certain that there is no connection between my dog’s blackness and my cold. 
 Finally, there are cases where a rational agent is certain that X hypothetically 
explains P and that X obtains, but she does change her credence in P when she learns 
information that she does not consider explanatory.  Suppose that a rational agent is 
certain that I have a vitamin C deficiency and that my vitamin C deficiency is a 
hypothetical explanation of my cold.  Suppose she then becomes certain that an infallible 
crystal ball predicts that I get a cold.  The crystal ball’s prediction does not, in her 
opinion, bear any explanatory relation to my cold.  Nevertheless, if her credence that I get 
a cold was .7, it increases when she learns of the crystal ball’s prediction. 
 To take stock, we have seen that acquiring new information sometimes makes no 
difference to a rational agent’s credence in P when she is certain that X obtains and that X 
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hypothetically explains P.  This motivates the Hypothetical Explanation-Credence 
Principle (HCP) that I formulate in the following section.  I will argue that the relation 
between our rational opinions about hypothetical states of affairs and our opinions about 
hypothetical explanations (as described by HCP) can help to explain the relation between 
our rational opinions about outcomes and our opinions about the chances of outcomes (as 
described by SWAMPING).      
 But, as we have seen, new information does sometimes make a difference to a 
rational agent’s credence in P even though she is certain that X obtains and that X 
hypothetically explains P.  Call information that does not make a difference to a rational 
agent’s credence in P (when she is certain that X obtains and that X hypothetically 
explains P) “admissible” and the other information “inadmissible”.  In virtue of what is 
information admissible or inadmissible?  HCP, like SWAMPING, applies only to cases 
where a rational agent has no inadmissible information, so we cannot formulate HCP 
without first answering this question.   
 
2.3.  Admissibility and HCP 
 One lesson that the above cases teach is that admissibility is a highly relative 
notion.37  First, it is relative to an agent’s rational credence function.  For example, 
whether my hatred of citrus fruit is admissible for an agent depends on her other 
opinions, such as her opinions about the hypothetical explanatory relations between my 
hatred of citrus fruit, my vitamin C deficiency, and my cold.  And since an agent’s 
rational credence function evolves over time, admissibility must be relative to a particular 
time, not just to a particular agent.  Second, whether some information is admissible 
                                                           
37 Hall (2004) makes a similar point. 
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depends (in part) on a rational agent’s opinions about the hypothetical explanatory 
relation between that information and the particular hypothetical state of affairs P that she 
is considering.  So, admissibility is relative to P.    
 How must the hypothetical states of affairs R and P relate to an agent’s rational 
credence function at a time in order for R to be admissible with respect to P for that agent 
at that time?  Let’s begin by locating the relevant difference between the case where my 
hatred of citrus fruit counts as admissible (which is the first case in the previous section) 
and the case where the crystal ball’s prediction counts as inadmissible (which is the last 
case in the previous section).   
 My hatred of citrus fruit differs from the crystal ball’s prediction in that our 
rational agent believes that the former has some explanatory relation to my getting a cold, 
but that the latter does not.  However, she does not believe that my hatred of citrus fruit is 
itself a hypothetical explanation of my cold.  Rather, she considers my hatred of citrus 
fruit to be part of a hypothetical explanation of my cold that includes other hypothetical 
states of affairs (such as, for example, that I never eat fruit that I hate and that I have no 
other source of vitamin C). 
 But for many an R and P, there is some further hypothetical state of affairs that, 
when combined with R, yields a hypothetical explanation of P (for the agent).  Recall that 
the crystal ball’s prediction that I get a cold is inadmissible for our agent.  Nevertheless, 
the crystal ball’s prediction, combined with its being a natural law that crystal balls cause 
their predictions to become true, is a hypothetical explanation of my getting a cold for 
her.  So for R to qualify as admissible, it cannot be sufficient that R is part of any old 
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hypothetical explanation of P, on pain of too many R’s (such as the crystal ball’s 
prediction) counting as admissible.  
 What matters for admissibility is whether R is part of a hypothetical explanation 
of P in which the rest of that hypothetical explanation is a live option for that agent.38  
That I do not eat fruit that I hate and that I have no other access to citrus fruit is a live 
option for our agent, but that a crystal ball’s prediction causes my cold is not.      
 We have now narrowed in on the explanatory notion that is at the core of 
admissibility, which I call “hypothetical explanatory relevance” (HE relevance): 
 Hypothetical Explanatory Relevance:  For any hypothetical states of affairs R, 
 P, and any rational credence function C at some time t, R is HE relevant to P with 
 respect to Ct if and only if R is part of some hypothetical state of affairs X that is a 
 live option with respect to Ct and is such that Ct(X hypothetically explains P)=1.39 
  
HE relevance does a good job of distinguishing between my hatred of citrus fruit and the 
crystal ball’s prediction that I get a cold.  My hatred of citrus fruit is part of some X (that 
includes further hypothetical states of affairs such as that I never eat fruit that I hate) that 
is a live option for our agent and that she is certain is a hypothetical explanation of my 
cold.  So my hatred of citrus fruit is HE relevant to my cold for our agent.  But there is no 
X that includes the crystal ball’s prediction and is a live option for the agent that she is 
                                                           
38 A rough characterization of “live option” is that a state of affairs is a live option for an agent if and only 
if she has not ruled out that it obtains.  It is tempting to give “live option” a Bayesian treatment according 
to which a state of affairs is a live option for an agent if and only if her credence that it obtains is greater 
zero.  But that cannot be quite right.  Consider a lottery with an infinite number of tickets, and let P be that 
I win the lottery, let R be that I bought ticket 17, and let Y be that ticket 17 is the winning ticket.  R should 
count as admissible with respect to P (for most agents), and R and Y are a hypothetical explanation of P 
(for most agents).  But, if having a credence greater than zero in Y is required for Y to be a live option, Y is 
not a live option for any rational agent and so R is not part of a hypothetical explanation of P for any 
rational agent (at least not on the grounds that it and Y are a hypothetical explanation of P).  The difficulty 
here is a symptom of a broader question in Bayesian epistemology about how to treat cases where there are 
countably (or uncountably) infinite epistemic possibilities, and solving that problem is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.  For my purposes, the rough characterization of “live option” should suffice.   
 
39 R is HE Relevant to P with respect to Ct if R itself is (by Ct’s lights) a hypothetical explanation of P.  In 
such a case, R and X are the same hypothetical state of affairs. 
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certain is a hypothetical explanation of my cold.  So the crystal ball’s prediction is not 
HE relevant to my cold. 
 Though HE relevance is an important component of admissibility, it cannot be the 
entire story.  If my account of admissibility fails to properly identify all admissible and 
inadmissible information, I will end up with a version of HCP that is either too broad and 
thus false, or too narrow and thus cannot ground SWAMPING (and the PP) since it does not 
apply to every case in which chances are the guide to life.  The cases from the previous 
section demonstrate that some information that is not HE relevant is nevertheless 
admissible, and some information that is HE relevant is nevertheless inadmissible, so I 
require a more subtle account of admissibility. 
 Let’s first consider information that is not HE relevant to P for an agent, but is 
nevertheless admissible with respect to P for that agent, which I shall simply call 
“harmless” information.  Our earlier cases suggest that there are two varieties of harmless 
information.  My frequent nosebleeds are admissible for our rational agent (but not HE 
relevant) with respect to my cold.  She considers my frequent nosebleeds to be evidence 
regarding my cold, but only because my frequent nosebleeds are evidence of my vitamin 
C deficiency.  One way for R to be “harmless” for a rational agent with respect to P, then, 
is for her credence in P conditional on X (where the agent is certain that X hypothetically 
explains P) to be equal to her credence in P conditional on X and R. 
 The second way for R to be harmless with respect to P for a rational agent is for R 
to be irrelevant confirmation-wise for that agent.40  My dog’s blackness is admissible for 
                                                           
40 I have no formal definition of “irrelevant confirmation-wise”.  The rough idea is that a hypothetical state 
of affairs is irrelevant confirmation-wise to P for an agent exactly in case she should not take that state of 
affairs as confirming or disconfirming P.  Unfortunately, there is no simple Bayesian precisification of this 
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our rational agent (but not HE relevant) with respect to my cold because she considers 
my dog’s blackness as no evidence at all regarding my cold. 
 Thus, we can sum up harmless information as follows (letting Ct again be a 
rational credence function):   
 Harmless Information:  For any hypothetical states of affairs P and R, R is 
 harmless with respect to P and Ct if and only if R is not HE relevant to P with 
 respect to Ct and either 
  (i)  R is relevant confirmation-wise to P with respect to Ct but   
  Ct(P|X)=Ct(P|X&R) for any X such that Ct(X hypothetically explains P)=1  
  and Ct(X)>0. 41  
   or 
  (ii) R is irrelevant confirmation-wise to P with respect to Ct. 
     
All information that is harmless with respect to P (for an agent) is admissible with respect 
to P (for that agent).42  By recognizing that harmless information is admissible, we ensure 
that HCP applies to a wide range of cases in which rational agents use statistical 
reasoning.   
 Now let’s take into account the case where information that is HE relevant is 
nevertheless inadmissible so that our analysis of admissibility protects HCP from all 
                                                           
idea that does not run afoul of the problem of old evidence (Glymour 1980), and addressing that problem is 
beyond the scope of this essay. 
41 I require that Ct(X) not equal 0, since otherwise the conditional probabilities in the equality given in (i) 
are undefined.  What if there are no X’s such that Ct(X hypothetically explains P)=1 and Ct(X)>0, as is the 
case when an agent has distributed her credences evenly across an infinite number of hypotheses?  In all 
such cases, the conditional probabilities in the antecedent of HCP will be undefined, so (though HCP will 
be trivially true of these cases) it will not yield any counterintuitive results.  Admittedly, both the Principal 
Principle and HCP have difficulty accommodating our robust intuitions about the rational credences of 
agents who face an infinite number of hypotheses that they have not “ruled out”.  I think this is a prima 
facie problem for HCP (and the PP), but HCP could not explain the PP if it did not suffer from it.   
 
42 One might wonder whether I am right that all HE irrelevant information that is irrelevant confirmation-
wise counts as admissible.  Perhaps it is controversial that SWAMPING and the PP apply to cases where an 
agent has obtained HE irrelevant information that is irrelevant confirmation-wise if the information is had 
through a typically inadmissible way (such as through a reliable crystal ball’s prediction or as testimony 
from a time-traveler).  It seems to me that SWAMPING and the PP govern the rational credences of agents 
that have such information.  I should still obey the PP when forming my expectations about a coin toss, for 
example, even if I am certain that a reliable crystal ball predicts that I get a cold tomorrow (provided that I 
do not believe there to be any relationship between my getting a cold tomorrow and the outcome of a coin 
toss).   
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spurious counterexamples (such as the example I consider in the next section).  Recall the 
case where my hatred of citrus fruit is inadmissible for a rational agent who is certain that 
either I do not hate citrus fruit or I will not get a cold.  My hatred of citrus fruit counts as 
inadmissible for our agent, although it is HE relevant with respect to my getting a cold, 
because it also provides the agent with evidence about my cold via what I call a “non-
explanatory route”, namely, through her credence that I will not get a cold.  Because she 
is certain that either I do not hate citrus fruit or I will not get a cold, learning that I hate 
citrus fruit increases her confidence that I will not get a cold.  This is a “non-explanatory 
route” because, for our agent, my not getting a cold is (of course) not HE relevant to my 
getting a cold.    
 There is one further qualification.  Most (if not all) information that a rational 
agent learns changes her confidence in some further hypothetical state of affairs W that is 
not HE relevant to P.  Learning that I hate citrus fruit, for example, increases her 
confidence that I hate citrus-flavored candy, and my hatred of citrus-flavored candy is 
not, for our agent, HE relevant to my cold.  But information that changes a rational 
agent’s credence in harmless information alone has no effect on her credence in P, and so 
information that changes her confidence only in W’s that are harmless is admissible.  
 However, my not getting a cold is not harmless with respect to my getting a cold, 
since it, (unlike my hatred of citrus-flavored candy) is relevant confirmation-wise to my 
getting a cold.43  So learning that I hate citrus fruit is inadmissible for our agent because it 
                                                           
43 Despite being relevant confirmation-wise to my getting a cold, my not getting a cold would count as 
harmless if our agent’s credence that I get a cold (P) conditional on my having a vitamin C deficiency (X) 
were equal to her credence that I get a cold conditional on my not getting a cold (~P) and my having a 
vitamin C deficiency.  But clearly this equality is not true in this example.  Letting Crt be our rational 
agent’s credence function at t, Crt(P|X)≠ Crt(P|X & ~P).  
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changes her confidence that I will not get a cold, and my not getting a cold is neither HE 
relevant nor harmless with respect to my getting a cold.   
 The above case illustrates that, if R is HE relevant to P (for a rational agent) but R 
changes that agent’s confidence in some hypothetical state of affairs W that is not HE 
relevant to P (for that agent) and is not harmless with respect to P (for that agent), then R 
is inadmissible. 
 Again, let Ct be some rational credence function at a time.  I can finally present 
my analysis of admissibility: 
 Admissibility:  For any hypothetical states of affairs P, R, and W, R is admissible 
 with respect to P and Ct if and only if either 
  (i) R is harmless with respect to P and Ct 
   or 
        (ii) R is HE relevant to P with respect to Ct and, for any W such that W is  
   neither HE relevant nor harmless with respect to P and Ct, Ct(W|R)=Ct(W). 
 
This analysis correctly distinguishes canonical examples of admissible information (such 
as my hatred of citrus fruit) from canonical examples of inadmissible information (such 
as the predictions of a reliable crystal ball).  It also correctly distinguishes more subtle 
examples of admissible information (such as my frequent nosebleeds and my dog’s 
blackness) from more subtle examples of inadmissible information (such as the case 
where my hatred of citrus fruit provides a rational agent with information about my cold 
via a non-explanatory route).  Furthermore, as I discuss in the next section, this analysis 
of admissibility provides the resources required to defend HCP from apparent 
counterexamples.  Finally, the analysis ensures that HCP applies to all cases in which 
chances are a guide to life, which allows HCP to be broad enough to help explain 
SWAMPING.        
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 HCP is a formal codification of two morals that are illustrated by the cases 
involving admissible information from the previous section.  The first moral is that a 
rational agent who is certain that X obtains and that X is a hypothetical explanation of P 
will not change her credence in P despite acquiring new evidence, so long as her 
evidence remains confined to admissible evidence.  To state this moral formally, let C1t1 
stand for our agent’s rational credence function prior to learning the new information.  I 
make the Bayesian assumption that our agent’s credence function at t1 is rational exactly 
when it constitutes a reasonable initial credence function C1 conditionalized on our 
agent’s body of evidence through t1.44  I have stipulated that our agent is certain that X 
obtains, and that X is a hypothetical explanation of P.  Let E1 stand for the rest of her 
body of evidence prior to learning the new information, and assume that E1 is admissible.  
Putting these stipulations together, we get that 
 C1t1(P) = C1(P|X&X hypothetically explains P& E1). 
Now she learns some new admissible evidence.  Let E2 stand for her new body of 
evidence, which in this case includes E1, and again assume that E2 is admissible.  Her 
new credence function at t2 is C1t2, which is related to the initial credence function C1 as 
follows: 
 C1t2(P) = C1(P|X&X hypothetically explains P&E2)     
The first moral is that C1t1(P) = C1t2(P). 
 The second moral that HCP codifies is that two rational agents agree on their 
credence in P so long as both not only agree that X obtains and that X hypothetically 
                                                           
44 I will define the credence functions C1t1 and C1t2 in terms of initial credence function C1 to allow 
expressions such as C1t1(•)=C1(•|X & X hypothetically explains P & E) to remind the reader that 
C1t1(X)=C1t1 (X hypothetically explains P)=C1t2(X)=C1t2(X hypothetically explains P)=1, and that 
C1t2(•)=C1t1(•| E2)=C1(•| E1 and E2) for admissible bodies of evidence E1 and E2. 
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explains P, but also have only admissible evidence.  To express this moral, let C1t1 now 
be the first agent’s rational credence function at some time t1 and let E1 be that agent’s 
(admissible) body of evidence through t1.  C1t1(P) is the same as it was for our first 
moral: 
 C1t1(P) = C1(P|X&X hypothetically explains P&E1) 
Let C2t2 be the second agent’s rational credence function at some time t2 as arising from 
some initial rational credence function C2 conditionalized on the second agent’s 
(admissible) body of evidence E2 through to t2.  So long as both E1 and E2 are 
admissible, they may be distinct.  Then 
 C2t2(P) = C2(P|X&X hypothetically explains P& E2). 
Our second moral is that C1t1(P)=C2t2(P). 
 The idea behind both morals is that any two rational credence functions at time 
(whether they express the same agent’s opinions at two moments or different agents’ 
opinions) agree on the credence they assign to P so long as these functions are arrived at 
by conditionalizing on X, that X hypothetically explains P, and any admissible body of 
evidence.  HCP captures both morals. 
 Let ‘C1t1’ and ‘C2t2’ be rational credence functions at times t1 and t2 respectively.  
These might be the rational credence functions of the same agent at different times, for 
example, or the rational credence functions of two different agents at different times.  Let 
E1 and E2 stand for bodies of evidence.  They might be the same or distinct. 
We can state HCP as follows: 
 Hypothetical Explanation- Credence Principle (HCP):  For any hypothetical 
 states of affairs P and X, any admissible bodies of evidence E1 and E2, and any 
 reasonable initial credence functions C1 and C2, if C1t1(P) = C1(P|X&X 
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 hypothetically explains P&E1), and C2t2(P) =C2(P|X&X hypothetically explains 
 P& E1), then C1t1(P)=C2t2(P). 
 
In section 5, I use HCP to ground SWAMPING by considering instances of HCP in which X 
is that the chance of P equals n.  I will argue that HCP explains SWAMPING because, when 
a rational agent regards an outcome’s chance as a hypothetical explanation of that 
outcome, SWAMPING is merely a special case of HCP.  However, these very cases suggest 
an apparent counterexample to HCP that I spend the following section examining.              
 
2.4. Chances and Causal Chains 
 HCP does a good job of handling the case with which we began: if an agent learns 
that I hate citrus fruit, then her new information should make no difference to her 
credence that I get a cold if that agent was already certain that I have a vitamin C 
deficiency and that this deficiency is a hypothetical explanation of my cold.  But one 
might worry that this is too easy of a test case.  After all, in this case we imagine how an 
agent’s credence in P might be altered if she learns about an event causally upstream 
from the hypothetical state of affairs that she is already certain obtains and hypothetically 
explains P.  Because she is already certain of the relevant effect of the event she learns 
about, perhaps it is not surprising that learning about that event does not alter her 
credence in P.  A better test case for the truth of HCP, then, involves the agent’s learning 
about an event causally downstream from what she already knew. 
 For example, suppose a rational agent is considering whether she will develop 
lung cancer and is certain at some time t1 that the current chance of her developing lung 
cancer (in, say, the next twenty years) is .25.  Furthermore, suppose that she is certain 
that the current chance of her developing lung cancer is a hypothetical explanation of her 
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developing lung cancer.45  Finally suppose that (in accordance with the PP) her current 
credence that she will develop lung cancer is .25.   
 Imagine that, as time passes, her smoking causes her body to undergo cellular 
changes that make it more likely that she will develop lung cancer.  At this later time t2, 
the chance of her developing lung cancer increases to .5.  If the chance at t2 of her 
developing lung cancer is admissible for her at t2, then HCP is in trouble.  A rational 
agent’s credence at t2 that she develops lung cancer does not stay .25 when she learns 
that her present chance of lung cancer is .5!   
 I will argue that the chance at t2 of her developing lung cancer is not, in fact, 
admissible for our rational agent at t2.  In laying out the case, I described the agent as 
certain that the chance at t1 of her developing lung cancer is a hypothetical explanation of 
her developing lung cancer.  But this description is ambiguous between two importantly 
different ways in which she might conceive of that hypothetical explanation.  To see 
whether the chance at t2 of lung cancer is admissible, we must tease out this ambiguity in 
how the agent conceives of the explanatory relation between her developing lung cancer 
and its chance at t1.   
 Consider an analogy with dominos.  Suppose four dominos are arranged in a row 
so that if the first domino falls, all the dominos fall (one by one).  Imagine a rational 
agent who is certain that the last domino will not fall unless the first domino falls and 
causes the second domino to fall, and so on.  There is a sense in which this agent might 
regard the first domino falling (combined, perhaps, with the way that the dominos are 
arranged and the laws of motion) as a hypothetical explanation of the last domino falling.  
                                                           
45 As I will discuss in section 5, it is essential to my explanation of SWAMPING that rational agents are, in 
cases such as this one, certain that chances are hypothetical explanations of their outcomes. 
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But she does so only by conceiving of the first domino falling as a hypothetical 
explanation of the entire causal chain that culminates in the last domino falling. After all, 
if she does not conceive of the first domino falling as a hypothetical explanation of the 
entire causal chain, it is mysterious how the first domino falling is at all a hypothetical 
explanation for her of the last domino falling (given her background beliefs).  The only 
sense in which she can rationally conceive of the first domino falling as a hypothetical 
explanation of the last domino falling is that she conceives of the first domino falling as a 
hypothetical explanation of the entire causal chain.46   
 Not all explanations have this feature.  For example, given typical background 
beliefs, a rational agent can perfectly well conceive of a rod’s being copper and its being 
a natural law that all copper conducts electricity as a hypothetical explanation of the rod’s 
conductivity without conceiving of the former as a hypothetical explanation of some 
causal chain that ends with the latter.  In this case, the rational agent conceives of the 
rod’s being copper and the natural law as a hypothetical explanation of the rod’s 
conductivity not in virtue of their being a hypothetical explanation of something else, but 
rather as “directly” hypothetically explaining the rod’s conductivity.     
 How a rational agent conceives of a hypothetical explanation is crucial to the 
correct evaluation of whether some new information is admissible for her, because 
admissibility is relative (in part) to the hypothetical state of affairs that the agent takes to 
be (hypothetically) explained.  To determine whether her chance at t2 of developing lung 
                                                           
46 I do not mean to imply that the first domino falling is a hypothetical explanation of the last domino 
falling on the grounds that the first domino falling explains why all the dominos fell and all the dominos 
falling entails that the last domino fell.  It is not in general true that an explanation of P is an explanation of 
all the entailments of P.  The important feature of this case is that the first domino falling can be conceived 
of as a hypothetical explanation of the last domino falling only insofar as the first domino is conceived of 
as a hypothetical explanation of the causal chain that leads to the last domino falling. 
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cancer is admissible for our rational agent, we must decide whether she regards the 
chance at t1 to be a hypothetical explanation of a causal chain that culminates in lung 
cancer (as in the domino case) or whether she regards the chance at t1 as a direct 
hypothetical explanation of her lung cancer (as in the conductivity case). 
 If a rational agent regards the chance at t1 of her developing lung cancer as a 
direct hypothetical explanation of her developing lung cancer, then the lung cancer case 
is a genuine counterexample to HCP.  Recall that, on my analysis of admissibility, 
information that is HE relevant for an agent to P is admissible provided that it does not 
change her credence in any non-harmless W’s (and so does not give her any information 
about P via a non-explanatory route).  The chance at t2 of her developing lung cancer is 
admissible, then, because it is HE relevant to lung cancer (if, as is essential to my 
explanation of SWAMPING, chances are hypothetical explanations) and it does not change 
her credence in any non-harmless W’s. 
 But I think that an agent must instead conceive of the chance at t1 of her 
developing lung cancer as a hypothetical explanation of a causal chain that ends with 
lung cancer.  The lung cancer case is just a probabilistic version of the domino case 
where the causal chain being explained includes various carcinogenic cellular events.  It 
is part of the agent’s background beliefs that there are carcinogenic events that form a 
causal chain (though she need not know much about these events) and that the conditions 
at t1 cause, in turn, each of the events in that chain after t1.  In light of her background 
beliefs, she must consider the chance at t1 of her developing lung cancer to be a 
hypothetical explanation of the entire causal chain after t1.  After all, if she does not 
conceive of the chance at t1 of her developing lung cancer as a hypothetical explanation 
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of the intermediate links of that chain, then it is mysterious how the chance at t1 manages 
to be a hypothetical explanation of the lung cancer at the chain’s end.47   
 If that is correct, then the chance at t2 of her developing lung cancer is not 
admissible.  Let P be a causal chain that ends in the agent developing lung cancer.  Let X 
be the chance at t1 of her developing lung cancer (which is .25), and let R be the chance 
at t2 of her developing lung cancer (which is .5).  R is HE relevant to P for our agent, 
since R is a hypothetical explanation of the part of the causal chain (hypothetically) 
occurring after t2 that goes to lung cancer.    
 For R to be admissible if it is HE relevant to P, the agent’s learning R must not 
change her credence in any non-harmless hypothetical state of affairs.  But her learning R 
increases her confidence in W: that cellular changes occur in the agent.  And W is not 
harmless.  Recall that for W to not be harmless, it must meet three conditions:  it must not 
be HE relevant to P for our agent, it must be relevant confirmation-wise to P for our 
agent, and it must be such that the agent’s credence in P given X (which the agent is 
certain is a hypothetical explanation of P) is not equal to her credence in P given X and 
W.  W, in this case, meets all three conditions.  First, W is not HE relevant to P, since no 
rational agent considers the occurrence of cellular changes to be part of a hypothetical 
explanation of that very occurrence.  Second, W is relevant confirmation-wise to P for 
our agent, since the occurrence of cellular changes confirms that she will develop lung 
cancer.  Third, our agent’s credence in P given X is not equal to her credence in P given 
                                                           
47 If instead the agent thinks that by “action at a temporal distance” the earlier conditions at t1 directly 
cause the lung cancer, then she may conceive of the chance at t1 of her developing lung cancer as a direct 
hypothetical explanation of her developing lung cancer.  But such an agent would not take the chances of 
her developing lung cancer to have changed at t2! 
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X and W, since learning that cellular changes occur makes her more confident that she 
develops lung cancer.  
 Learning that R obtains increases the agent’s credence that W obtains, since 
(given her background beliefs about the causal chains that lead to lung cancer and about 
the temporal evolution of chance values) the fact that her chance of lung cancer has 
increased makes her more confident that she has undergone cellular changes.48  Since W 
is not harmless, R gives the agent information about P via a non-explanatory route 
(through W) and is thus inadmissible.  Therefore, if the agent conceives of the chance at 
t1 of her developing lung cancer as a hypothetical explanation of a causal chain that leads 
to lung cancer (not as a “direct” hypothetical explanation of lung cancer), then the lung 
cancer case is not a counterexample to HCP.           
 The lung cancer case seemed to threaten HCP because it involves information that 
is causally downstream from a hypothetical explanation.  But on reflection, information 
that is causally downstream from a hypothetical explanation that involves a chance will 
not typically be admissible, since rational agents conceive of such chances as 
hypothetical explanations of entire causal chains, not merely as hypothetical explanations 
of the last link of those chains.   
 In the following section, I will elaborate an important moral to draw from the lung 
cancer case: that a chance does not always wear on its sleeve the hypothetical state of 
affairs of which it is (for the rational agent in question) a hypothetical explanation.  In 
applying HCP to cases where hypothetical explanations involve chances, one must take 
                                                           
48 To simplify the case, I supposed that learning that R obtains increases her credence that cellular changes 
have occurred.  But W does not need to be so specific.  Learning that R obtains might merely increase her 
credence that some event in a causal chain that leads to lung cancer has occurred after t1.   
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care to properly identify what hypothetical state of affairs the agent takes the chance to be 
a hypothetical explanation of.    
 To take stock, I have identified HCP and given an analysis of admissibility.  I 
have further shown how my analysis of admissibility protects HCP from a putative 
counterexample that arises when X is the chance of P.  Now we are (at last!) in a position 
to see that SWAMPING follows from HCP when rational agents are certain that the chance 
of P is a hypothetical explanation of P. 
 
2.5.  From HCP to SWAMPING 
 Suppose that a rational agent is certain that the chance of some coin landing heads 
after being flipped is a hypothetical explanation of the coin landing heads.  Further 
suppose that she is certain that the chance of the coin landing heads is .5.  Finally suppose 
that the information on which she has I has all been admissible.  Then, HCP tells us that 
her credence in heads is determined by the .5 chance of landing heads that she is certain 
that the coin has. 
 Recall that SWAMPING says that a rational agent’s credences in the chance of an 
outcome determine her credence in that outcome, so long as she has only admissible 
information.  HCP entails that SWAMPING is true of the agent in our example.  Her 
credence in heads is determined by the chance of landing heads that she ascribes to the 
coin (so long as she is certain that this chance is a hypothetical explanation of heads and 
she has only admissible information). 
 More generally, HCP entails that SWAMPING is true in any case where a rational 
agent is certain that an outcome’s chance hypothetically explains that outcome and also 
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certain of the chance’s value.49  If it is in general true that rational agents are certain that 
an outcome’s chance hypothetically explains that outcome, then SWAMPING follows from 
the relation given in HCP between rational opinions regarding hypothetical explanations 
and rational opinions regarding what they explain.   
 Admittedly, not every well-defined chance of an outcome is a hypothetical 
explanation of that outcome.50  Some philosophers (including Lewis) have held that the 
chance now of an event in the past is 0 if that event occurred and 1 otherwise.  The 
chance now, for example, that Oswald murdered Kennedy is 1 if and only if he did.  But 
it is clearly permissible for a rational agent not to regard the chance now that Oswald 
murdered Kennedy as a hypothetical explanation of Kennedy’s murder.  Similarly, 
suppose I am certain that all contradictions are false.  I am also certain that the chance 
that all contradictions are false is 1. But clearly I am not obliged to regard this chance as 
a hypothetical explanation of the falsity of contradictions.        
 Any sorting of chances into those that are and those that are not hypothetical 
explanations of their “outcomes” will be controversial.  For example, I argue that there 
can be a non-extremal objective chance now of some event now (e.g. that a given well-
shuffled deck of cards now has a spade on top).51  I call these “synchronic chances”.  
Rational agents, I believe, often regard synchronic chances as hypothetical explanations 
                                                           
49 A weaker, but equally plausible, version of HCP entails that SWAMPING is true of agents who are not 
certain of the value of the chance of some outcome, but rather distribute their rational credence over (a 
potentially infinite) number of chance propositions that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.  
This weaker version of HCP is more complicated, since it requires an application of the theorem of total 
probability.  But, the point remains the same.  So long as the agent is certain that each one of the chance 
propositions is a hypothetical explanation of the outcome, SWAMPING follows from the weakened version 
of HCP.   
 
50 We have already seen one illustration of this moral in Chapter 2, section 4. 
 
51 See Chapter 4. 
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of their outcomes.  However, a philosopher who agrees with Lewis that synchronic 
chances must have values equal only to either 0 or 1 might agree with me that rational 
agents generally regard chances as hypothetical explanations, but deny that synchronic 
chances explains.  Likewise, if backwards causation is conceptually possible, then some 
beliefs about the chance now of an event in the past might involve beliefs about 
hypothetical explanations.  But a philosopher who denies the coherence of backwards 
causation is likely to deny that rational agents ever have any confidence that these so-
called “inverse probabilities” are hypothetical explanations of past hypothetical states of 
affairs. 
 That said, the above sort of case presents little threat to my explanation of 
SWAMPING.  SWAMPING and the Principal Principle are meant to apply to cases in which 
chances are a guide to life.  The very same considerations that motivate denying that 
synchronic probabilities, inverse probabilities, and vacuous probabilities (such as the 
probability of logical truths) are hypothetical explanations motivate denying that such 
chances are a guide to life.  For example, while it is true that the chance that all 
contradictions are false is 1 and that I am rationally certain that all contradictions are 
false, had there been no such thing as objective chance I would nevertheless be rationally 
certain that all contradictions are false.  Similarly, philosophers who are skeptical that 
synchronic and inverse probabilities are hypothetical explanations presumably also hold 
that our rational epistemic attitudes about the past and present are not to be explained by 
our rational beliefs about the chances of outcomes occurring in the past and present.   
 Still, one might worry that there is a class of case in which a rational agent fails to 
view the chance of an outcome as a hypothetical explanation of that outcome even though 
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the chance of that outcome nevertheless constrains her rational credence.  There was a 
time when the received philosophical view of scientific explanation, thanks largely to 
Hempel, was that the logical structure of scientific explanations is identical to the logical 
structure of arguments.52  Good statistical explanations, according to this “symmetry 
thesis”, are formally identical to good inductive arguments.  So, a rational agent has 
reason to predict the occurrence of some hypothetical state of affairs if she knows the 
hypothetical explanation of that state of affairs and that the hypothetical explanation is 
true.  Low chance values make for weak inductive arguments, so someone impressed by 
the symmetry thesis will not regard the chance of some outcome as a hypothetical 
explanation of that outcome if the value of that chance is low.   
 Thanks to Scriven, Salmon, Jeffrey and others, the symmetry thesis has been 
thoroughly refuted, including its entailment that unlikely outcomes have no 
explanations.53  Unlikely events do occur, and we understand their occurrences just as 
well as we understand the occurrences of likely events.  We sell ourselves, and our best 
scientific theories, short if we adopt the view that only likely events are explicable in 
principle.    
 However, the fact that it is false that unlikely events have no explanation does not 
entail that it is irrational to believe that unlikely events have no explanation.  Why can’t a 
rational agent, albeit mistakenly, fail to regard the low chance of an outcome as a 
hypothetical explanation of that outcome on the grounds that the occurrence of that 
outcome is inexplicable?  After all, the history of the philosophical discussion of 
                                                           
52 Hempel (1965) 
 
53 See Scriven (1959), Salmon (1965), and Jeffery (1969) 
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scientific explanation seems to demonstrate that many rational agents have actually held 
this view.  
 I have no argument that it is impossible for a rational agent to hold that unlikely 
events are inexplicable.  I have no explanation to offer, then, for why SWAMPING and the 
PP govern a rational agent’s credence in some unlikely outcome that she considers 
inexplicable.  However, this may well be a virtue of my account, since it is not at all clear 
that SWAMPING and the PP do govern such an agent’s rational credence.  How confident 
should an agent with only admissible information be in the occurrence of some event that 
has absolutely no explanation?  It is easy to see how inadmissible information, such as 
testimony from a reliable psychic, might constrain her credence in the occurrence of an 
inexplicable event.  But, it is hard to see how any admissible information, let alone 
chance values, could constrain a rational agent’s credence in an event that she believes to 
be in principle inexplicable.   
 I suspect that most rational agents do, if perhaps only implicitly, believe that low 
probability events have explanations.  Admittedly, it is counterintuitive that, say, the 
explanation for my winning the lottery is that it was hugely unlikely.  But this intuition 
does not reveal, I think, a belief that my winning the lottery has no explanation.  It is 
instead a symptom of the suspicion that it merely seemed unlikely (given our lack of 
evidence about the microphysical properties of the lottery setup and the fundamental laws 
that govern those properties) that I would win the lottery, and that the true objective 
probability of my winning was in fact very high (perhaps extremal).  But if we are 
convinced that the objective probability of my winning the lottery was very low, I believe 
that many of us will nevertheless regard my winning as explicable.  
  47 
 What about agents who believe that unlikely events are explicable, but are not 
certain that those outcomes are explained by their low chance value?  Imagine the 
position of an agent who asserts, “I am sure that the chance that this coin lands heads is 
.5, but I am unsure whether, if the coin lands heads, the chance has anything to do with 
explaining that outcome.”  What could reasonably make her doubt the chance’s 
explanatory power?  If she is certain of the outcome’s chance, then she has ruled out that 
there is any deterministic explanation of the coin landing heads.  She might have some 
confidence that there is an indeterministic explanation of the coin landing heads that 
rivals the explanation that the chance of heads is .5, but then she is not certain that the 
objective chance of heads is .5!54  So, there is something conceptually odd about the 
assertion that she is certain of the chance of an outcome, but uncertain whether that 
chance is a hypothetical explanation of that outcome. 
 However, there is one way a rational agent can be certain of the chance of an 
outcome, but uncertain what hypothetically explains that outcome.  Suppose that a 
rational agent conceives of chances as dispositions, believes that dispositions are causally 
inert, and holds that only causes are explanations.55  She might then coherently assert that 
she is certain that the chance of heads is .5, but that she is uncertain what explains the 
coin landing heads if it does (since she is uncertain what might cause the coin to land 
                                                           
54 She might have some confidence in some global (perhaps unificationist) sort of explanation of the coin 
landing heads.  But her confidence in a more global explanation need not undercut her confidence that the 
chance also explains the outcome.  It is a familiar phenomenon that the same event has more than one 
compatible explanation. (See Salmon (1990) for an excellent discussion of compatible explanations.) What 
is incoherent is for her to have some confidence in a global explanation that she considers to really be a 
rival to the chance explanation, but to nevertheless be certain that the objective chance of heads is .5. 
 
55 Elizabeth Prior, for example, maintains that dispositions are causally inert.  On her view, detailed in 
Prior (1995), dispositions are the second-order property of having a causally efficacious first-order 
property. 
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heads).  SWAMPING is true of her, but this fact cannot be explained by HCP since she 
denies that the chance of heads is a hypothetical explanation of heads. 
 Though the letter of HCP cannot explain why this agent obeys SWAMPING, its 
spirit can.  Consider an analogy.  Earlier we encountered the case of a rational agent who 
is certain that a vitamin C deficiency is a hypothetical explanation of my cold and that I 
have a vitamin C deficiency, and whose credence that I get a cold is .7.  To help motivate 
HCP, I argued that her credence that I get a cold remains .7 so long as she only acquires 
admissible information.  Now suppose that she has forgotten that it is a vitamin C 
deficiency that hypothetically explains my cold, but she recalls that there is some 
condition that is a hypothetical explanation of my cold.  Further suppose she is certain 
that I have that condition, and that she knows the causal relationship between that 
condition and my cold.  It seems that no additional admissible information makes any 
difference to her credence that I get a cold, including the fact that it is a vitamin C 
deficiency rather than, say, a vitamin E deficiency, that is a hypothetical explanation of 
my cold.  Even though she is unsure of what is a hypothetical explanation of my cold, she 
knows enough about that hypothetical explanation for her credence that I get a cold to 
remain stable in light of additional admissible information. 
 The agent who denies that chances are hypothetical explanations on the grounds 
that they are causally inert is in the same position as is the agent who forgets that a 
vitamin C deficiency hypothetically explains my cold.  Though chances are not 
themselves hypothetical explanations on her view, they nevertheless provide her with 
important explanatory information.  If she is certain that the chance of heads is .5, then 
she is also certain that some causally efficacious properties obtain that explain the coin 
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landing heads if it does.  Furthermore, while chances are not themselves causes on her 
view, chance values presumably measure the causal relationship between the causal 
properties and the coin landing heads if it does.  So, given that she is certain of the chance 
of heads, she is also certain of every feature of the relevant hypothetical explanation of 
heads except for what that hypothetical explanation actually is.  Just as in the case of the 
forgetful agent, no additional admissible information, including what the hypothetical 
explanation of heads is, makes a difference to her credence that the coin land heads.  
SWAMPING is true of this agent, not because she is certain of a hypothetical explanation of 
heads, but because she knows enough about that hypothetical explanation in virtue of 
knowing the chance of heads.   
 Rational agents obey SWAMPING, then, because of explanatory role that objective 
chance plays.  If a rational agent is certain that the chance of an outcome is a hypothetical 
explanation of that outcome, then SWAMPING is merely a special case of HCP.  If instead 
a rational agent believes that chances provide information about the hypothetical 
explanation of an outcome, she nevertheless obeys SWAMPING and for very similar 
reasons.   
 
2.6.  Conclusion 
 I have argued that an agent’s rational opinions about states of affairs that she is 
certain are hypothetical explanations swamp her other admissible evidence in the same 
way that an agent’s rational opinions about chances swamp her other admissible 
evidence.  In so doing, I have elaborated HCP and developed a novel account of 
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“admissibility” that describes the conditions under which HCP, SWAMPING, and the PP 
apply.   
 HCP entails SWAMPING when agents are certain that an outcome’s chance is a 
hypothetical explanation of that outcome.  That result, of course, does not prove that HCP 
and our conception of chances as explainers are what explain SWAMPING.  SWAMPING 
might instead be part of an explanation of HCP (or of an explanation of our conception of 
chance).  But the analysis of admissible information that I have defended invokes HE 
relevance.  This suggests that our rational opinions about hypothetical explanations are at 
the heart of SWAMPING and the PP.  Furthermore, it strikes me as less mysterious for 
beliefs about hypothetical explanations to constrain rational credences than for beliefs 
about chances to constrain rational credences.  For these reasons, I am optimistic that the 
direction of explanation goes from HCP and our conception of chances as hypothetical 
explainers to SWAMPING.    
 If my explanation of SWAMPING is correct, then we have a new explanation of a 
notoriously puzzling aspect of the PP.  Because SWAMPING is explained by HCP and the 
explanatory role that chances essentially play (rather than by anything that chances 
reduce to), non-reductive theories have no special difficulty explaining this aspect of the 
PP.  Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter 1, some notable reductive theories (which were 
supposed to be our best hope of explaining the PP) seem unable to accommodate the 
explanatory role that chances play and so cannot employ my explanation of SWAMPING.  
Far from being non-starters unable to shed any light on the PP, non-reductive theories of 
chance are well-suited to explain SWAMPING− and thus to ground Butler’s maxim that 
chances are the very guide to life. 
3. Deriving the Principal Principle 
3.1.  Introduction 
 The aim of the previous chapter was to explain why a rational agent’s credences 
in the chance of an outcome determine her credence in that outcome.  I called this 
phenomenon “SWAMPING” and argued that an agent’s rational opinions about 
hypothetical explanations swamp her other (admissible) evidence in precisely the way 
that an agent’s rational opinions about chances swamp her other (admissible) evidence. If 
rational opinions about chances involve rational opinions about hypothetical 
explanations, then SWAMPING is merely a special instance of a broader principle (HCP) 
that relates rational opinions regarding hypothetical explanations to rational opinions 
regarding what they explain.  
 Of course, the fact that a rational agent’s credences in the chance of an outcome 
determine her credence in that outcome in some way or another does not entail that they 
do so in precisely the way the Principal Principle (PP) describes.  According to the PP, if 
a rational agent is certain that the chance of some outcome is n (a real number between 0 
and 1 inclusive), then her credence in that outcome is equal to n (so long as she has no 
“inadmissible” information).  But it is consistent with the truth of SWAMPING that her 
credence be any value whatsoever, so long as that value is set by the value of n.  More 
than SWAMPING is required to explain the full demands of the PP.     
 The aim of this chapter is to continue the project of explaining the PP by framing 
it as a consequence of the explanatory role that objective chance plays in our everyday 
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reasoning and our best scientific theories.  In this chapter, I will provide a derivation of 
the PP that presupposes SWAMPING and the account of admissibility found in the previous 
chapter.  Since SWAMPING is insufficient to entail the PP, the derivation requires several 
additional premises.  The more substantive and important of these are motivated just as 
SWAMPING and my account of admissibility are:  by connections between hypothetical 
explanations and rational credence.   
 I begin in section 2 by describing my general strategy for deriving the PP.56 In 
section 3, I motivate two substantive premises about the abductive confirmation of 
hypotheses that concern chances.  In section 4, I remind the reader of the consequences of 
SWAMPING and introduce two additional (and more modest) premises.  Finally, in section 
6, I provide the derivation of the PP.   
 
3.2.  Strategy 
 Suppose that a rational agent is considering only two hypotheses about the 
objective chance at a given time that some outcome E occurs.  Letting 
€ 
Cht  stand for an 
objective chance function at t, and x and y stand for real numbers between 0 and 1 
(inclusive), suppose that our agent is contemplating the rival hypotheses that 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  
and that 
€ 
Cht (E) = y .  Further suppose that, given our agent’s background evidence, her 
present credence in each hypothesis is .5.  Now the agent learns that E occurs.  How 
ought she to adjust her credences in the two hypotheses given this new total evidence?   
 Bayesian epistemology offers us an answer to this question.  According to 
Bayesian conditionalization, our agent’s credence that 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  (after learning that E 
                                                           
56 Though most sentences of this dissertation deserve a footnote crediting Marc Lange, I am especially 
indebted to him for discovering, and sharing, this derivation. 
  53 
occurs) should be equal to her prior degree of confidence in 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  conditional on E.  
And, her credence that 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  (after learning that E occurs) should be equal to her 
prior degree of confidence in 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  conditional on E.  In other words, letting “Cr” 
stand for the agent’s prior credence function and “
€ 
Cr*” stand for her credence function 
after she learns that E occurs, Bayesian conditionalization tells us that 
€ 
Cr*(Cht (E) = x) = Cr(Cht (E) = x | E)  and 
€ 
Cr*(Cht (E) = y) = Cr(Cht (E) = y | E) . 
 There is, of course, much controversy over whether Bayesianism always entails 
the uniquely correct way to manage doxastic attitudes.  Much of this controversy is 
irrelevant to the present case, however, since we may simply imagine that the case has 
none of the features that present challenges to Bayesianism.57  It is widely agreed that 
Bayesian conditionalization correctly describes rational updating for a wide range of 
cases, and it is extremely plausible that, at least in this simple case, our agent will adjust 
her credences in the two hypotheses in accord with Bayesian conditionalization. 
 Once we have granted Bayesian conditionalization in this instance, our question 
of what our agent’s new credences should be that 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  and that 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  after 
she learns that E occurs is answered by Bayes’ theorem.  According to Bayes’ theorem 
our agent’s credence in the hypothesis that 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  , for example, obeys the 
following equality:   
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E) =
Cr(Cht (E) = x)Cr(E |Cht (E) = x)
Cr(E)  
 Bayes’ theorem shows that the rational confirmation of chance hypotheses is 
partly sensitive to the implications of the Principal Principle.  The PP (in cases where a 
                                                           
57 There is no problem of old evidence in this case, for example, nor is there any relevant dispute about 
how our agent came by her prior degrees of confidence.   
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rational agent has no inadmissible information) determines the degree of confidence a 
rational agent has that some outcome will occur given the chance value of that outcome.  
In other words, the PP determines a unique value for the second term in the numerator: 
€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = x).  So, using Bayes’ theorem to determine how our rational agent 
should respond to evidence E requires an application of the PP. 
 But Bayesian epistemology is not our only theory of the conditions under which 
hypotheses are confirmed or disconfirmed.  We often, in both everyday and scientific 
reasoning, make inferences on the basis of the explanatory virtues of the hypotheses we 
consider.  If I return home to discover that my new leather shoes are now in damp pieces 
and strewn throughout the house, I infer that my dog is to blame.  I do not infer, for 
example, that my neighbors snuck in through an unlocked window, cut up my shoes with 
scissors, wet the individual pieces, and then scattered the pieces throughout my house in 
an attempt to frame my dog.  Even though both hypotheses accommodate the evidence, 
the former strikes me as a better explanation than the latter (along dimensions such as 
simplicity and coherence with my background beliefs), and on those grounds I infer the 
former.  Such inferences are instances of abduction or “Inference to the Best 
Explanation”. 
 Like Bayesian epistemology, abduction is controversial.  Perhaps the most famous 
argument that abduction does not track truth comes from Bas van Fraassen.  On van 
Fraassen’s view, Bayesianism and abduction entail incompatible answers to the question 
of how our rational agent will manage her credences when she learns that E occurs.  
Bayesianism entails that she updates in accord with Bayes’ theorem, while abduction 
suggests that (after updating) she gives an additional credential bump to whichever of the 
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two hypotheses best explains E.  Since Bayesianism gives the right answer (as Dutch 
book arguments purport to show), abduction must give the wrong answer.58   
 However, many philosophers have rejected van Fraassen’s argument on the 
ground that there is a role for explanatory considerations to play in confirmation that 
complements, rather than competes with, Bayesianism.59  So long as abductive inferences 
are not an adjusting of the credences prescribed by Bayes’ theorem, but make some other 
contribution to a rational agent’s credence function (by determining her priors, for 
example), there is no tension between Bayesian updating and abduction.60  On this view, 
Bayesianism and abduction offer compatible answers to the question of how our rational 
agent ought to manage her credences in light of E.61 Throughout what follows, I will 
assume that this view is correct, and that Bayesianism and abduction place compatible 
constraints on rational confirmation. 
 If rational agents regard chances as candidate explanations of their outcomes62, 
then abduction plays some role in determining how our agent will adjust her credence in 
the two chance hypotheses when she learns that E occurs.  This suggests a novel strategy 
for deriving the Principal Principle.  By using what we know about how explanatory 
                                                           
58 Van Fraassen (1989) 
 
59 See Lipton (1991), Weisberg (2009) for examples.  Weisberg sees abduction as providing a way to solve 
the problems associated with subjective Bayesianism. 
 
60 As Weisberg points out, any interesting kind of abduction is inconsistent with subjective Bayesianism, 
since subjectivists maintain that there are no rational constrains on prior probabilities other than the 
probability calculus.  But since I assume that the Principal Principle is true, I am already at odds with the 
subjective Bayesian.   
 
61 The argument that follows suggests that explanatory considerations play a crucial role in grounding the 
Principal Principle, and so help to determine a rational agent’s credence in likelihoods when she is 
considering chance hypotheses.     
 
62 See Chapter 2 for an argument that they do. 
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hypotheses are confirmed and disconfirmed (in conjunction with a few additional 
assumptions), we can determine how our agent ought to respond when she learns that E 
occurs.  Then, since Bayesian updating also determines how our agent ought to respond 
when she learns that E occurs, we can deduce, via Bayes’ theorem, how the function that 
yields the value of 
€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = x) must behave.  Since that function just is the PP, 
we will have derived the PP from the epistemic features of explanation and the 
explanatory nature of objective chance. 
 
3.3.  Abduction 
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a general precisification of 
abductive inference, but the derivation does require that I pinpoint how abduction applies 
to the particular case I have set out.  First, under what condition does evidence E confirm 
the hypothesis that 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over the hypothesis that 
€ 
Cht (E) = y ?  The answer that 
abduction offers is that E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  exactly on the condition 
that 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  supplies a better hypothetical explanation of E than does 
€ 
Cht (E) = y .  
Of course, this answer is not terribly informative without an account of the conditions 
under which one hypothetical explanation is better than another.   
 Though giving a general theory of what makes one hypothetical explanation 
better than another is surely difficult, to derive the PP I need only identify the conditions 
under which one chance hypothesis is a better hypothetical explanation than is another.63  
                                                           
63 “Better” explanations are generally taken to be explanations that are simpler, more informative, and 
more unifying than their competitors if true.  I set aside the question of why certain chance hypotheses are 
better explanations than other chance hypotheses to perform the more modest task of identifying some 
conditions under which one chance hypothesis is a better explanation than is its rival (never mind why).  
My suspicion is that, in the kinds of cases I will discuss, our intuitions about which chance hypothesis is the 
better explanation are tracking how informative those chance hypotheses are. 
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Furthermore, I am exclusively concerned with comparing the explanatory merits of 
chance hypotheses in the context of the particular case with which we began.  In 
supposing that our rational agent has an equal degree of confidence in each of the two 
chance hypotheses, I suppose that neither is favored by her background beliefs.  In such a 
case, when is one chance hypothesis a better hypothetical explanation of some outcome 
than a rival chance hypothesis?   
 Suppose that I have purchased a lottery ticket and am considering the probability 
of my winning.  Suppose I know that the probability (prior to the ticket drawing) that I 
win the lottery is either high or low, and I am equally confident in both chance 
hypotheses.  Now my ticket is drawn and I win.  Which hypothesis is a better 
hypothetical explanation of my winning the lottery?  I submit that the hypothetical 
explanation according to which my winning was very probable is the better hypothetical 
explanation of my winning. Thus, when I discover that I won the lottery, I rationally 
become more confident that the chance of my winning was high and I rationally become 
less confident that my chance of winning was low. 
 One might worry that the above example illustrates Bayesian conditionalization 
rather than abduction.  After all, it is a consequence of Bayes’ theorem that I should 
become more confident in the hypothesis that assigns a higher probability to my winning 
the lottery and less confident in the hypothesis that assigns a lower probability to my 
winning the lottery when I learn that I have won.  Furthermore, this consequence is 
arrived at, in part, via an application of the PP.  If it is the results of Bayes’ theorem and 
the PP that motivate my claim about what makes one chance hypothesis a better 
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hypothetical explanation than a rival chance hypothesis, I cannot then use abduction to 
derive the PP on threat of vicious circularity. 
 As we will see, the derivation of the PP assumes that Bayesian updating and 
abduction give compatible, rather than competing, descriptions of rational confirmation.  
So, I must admit that the lottery scenario can be appropriately described from the 
standpoint of Bayesian updating.  Furthermore, it is correct that I cannot ground my 
claims about abduction in Bayesian results that presuppose the PP.  However, the 
intuitively correct description of the lottery example can be motivated by purely 
explanatory considerations that make no appeal at all to Bayes’ theorem or the PP. 
 Earlier we noted that there is something intuitively unsatisfying about a 
hypothetical explanation of some hypothetical state of affairs according to which the 
probability of that hypothetical state of affairs is low.64  While some philosophers use this 
intuition to motivate the conclusion that low probability states of affairs have no 
explanation, I interpret that intuition as providing a moral about abduction.  Our 
reluctance to accept some hypothetical explanation as an actual explanation need not 
suggest that we believe that hypothetical explanation cannot be an explanation.   
 For example, I am skeptical that the best hypothetical explanation of the fact that 
my new leather shoes are in damp pieces and strewn through my house is that my 
neighbors are to blame.  But this is not because I think that my neighbor’s sneaking into 
my house and destroying my shoes cannot be an explanation of the state of my shoes.  
After all, I can imagine scenarios in which that hypothetical explanation is an actual 
explanation.65  Rather, it is just that I am confident that there actually is a better 
                                                           
64 See Chapter 2. 
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explanation of the state of my shoes that involves my dog and his preference for chewing 
leather shoes.  So our reluctance to accept some candidate hypothetical explanation can 
be symptomatic of our confidence that a better hypothetical explanation exists, rather 
than of our wholesale rejection of that candidate hypothetical explanation.       
 Similarly, our skepticism of hypothetical explanations according to which the 
probability of some outcome is low need not be interpreted as the view that low 
probability states of affairs have no explanation.  Instead, when we are offered a 
hypothetical explanation for some outcome according to which that outcome is unlikely, 
we are inclined (in the absence of further relevant information) to hold out hope for a 
better hypothetical explanation of that outcome.  For example, we might reject its being 
unlikely as a hypothetical explanation of my winning the lottery on the grounds that there 
is a better hypothetical explanation of my winning.  For example, if we knew more 
details about the lottery (such as the micro-features of the lottery setup and the 
fundamental physical laws), then we might discover a rival hypothetical explanation of 
my winning according to which the chance of my winning was very high.   
 Our reasonable inclination in the lottery example suggests that hypothetical 
explanations according to which the probability of an outcome is high are superior to 
hypothetical explanations according to which the probability of an outcome is low.  
Given the choice between a hypothetical explanation of some outcome according to 
which the outcome’s probability is high (as is most obvious when the hypothetical 
explanation is deterministic) and a hypothetical explanation of that outcome according to 
which the outcome’s probability is low, all other explanatory considerations being equal, 
                                                           
65 Namely, scenarios in which my neighbors (not my dog) have, in fact, destroyed my shoes. 
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we reasonably hold that the high probability hypothetical explanation is the better of the 
two. 
 The italicized “all other explanatory considerations being equal” is an important 
qualification since there are possible scenarios in which the low probability explanation is 
better than the high probability explanation.  Whether a rational agent considers one 
hypothetical explanation to be better than another is relative, in part, to her background 
beliefs.  If, for example, I believe that my neighbors often pull pranks on me with an eye 
toward framing my dog, and I believe my dog hates chewing on leather, then I may 
rationally regard the hypothetical explanation involving my neighbors to be better than 
the hypothetical explanation involving my dog.  Similarly, if a low probability 
hypothetical explanation of some outcome better coheres with a rational agent’s 
background beliefs than does a high probability hypothetical explanation of that outcome, 
she may regard the former as the better explanation.  So, it is not always true that higher 
chance values provide better hypothetical explanations.  But the above discussion 
suggests that, all other considerations of explanatory virtue being equal (as determined by 
a particular rational agent’s background beliefs), a higher chance value is a better 
hypothetical explanation than a lower chance value.   
 Confirmation by abduction, then, suggests the following thesis about the 
conditions under which chance hypotheses are confirmed: 
 Confirmation of the Best Chance Explanation (CBCE):  Given two chance 
 hypotheses, 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  and 
€ 
Cht (E) = y , E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over   
 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  for some rational agent exactly on the condition that 
€ 
x > y , provided 
 that the agent’s background beliefs do not favor either hypothesis. 
 
CBCE provides us with a particular condition under which one chance hypothesis is 
confirmed over another, but it does not offer a measure of the degree of confirmation that 
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E confers on the better hypothetical explanation.  As we will see below, the derivation 
requires such a measure, so I must identify the degree to which E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  
over 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  when 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  is a better hypothetical explanation of E than is 
€ 
Cht (E) = y .  For the time being, let us refer to the correct measure, whatever that 
measure might be, as the “Confirmation by Explanation Measure” or CEM. 
 To begin, consider some intuitive constraints on CEM.  First, suppose a rational 
agent is considering two rival hypothetical explanations of an outcome, and her 
background beliefs favor neither hypothesis over the other.  Imagine that the occurrence 
of the outcome is possible according to the first hypothetical explanation, but not possible 
according to the second hypothetical explanation.66  By CBCE, the first hypothetical 
explanation is the better of the two, which is consistent with the intuition we surely have 
that the second hypothetical explanation is as bad as it can be.   
 How much should the evidence that the outcome occurs confirm the first 
hypothetical explanation over the second?  It seems that the outcome should grant 
maximal confirmation to the first hypothetical explanation.  Since we have only two rival 
hypothetical explanations to consider, and the second rules out the occurrence of the 
outcome, the degree to which the outcome’s occurrence confirms the first hypothetical 
explanation over the second should be maximal.  Our first constraint, then, is that the 
degree to which E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  is maximal when 
€ 
y = 0 (and 
€ 
x ≠ y ).67   
                                                           
66 It is probably taking license with the word “explanation” to consider a hypothesis that counts some 
outcome as impossible as a hypothetical explanation.  But that semantic liberty should not make a 
difference for the philosophical point. 
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 Now suppose a rational agent is considering two hypothetical explanations that 
agree on the probability of some outcome, and again suppose that her background beliefs 
favor neither hypothesis.  By CBCE, neither of these hypothetical explanations should be 
confirmed over the other if the outcome occurs, since 
€ 
x = y  in this case (and the agent’s 
background beliefs do not favor either hypothesis).  For CEM to be consistent with 
CBCE, the measure should agree that no confirmation is given to either hypothetical 
explanation over the other.  Our second constraint, then, is that E confirms neither, or 
equally confirms, 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  or 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  when 
€ 
x = y . 
 Admittedly these constraints are very weak.  There are an infinite number of 
measures that satisfy them.  One such candidate for CEM is that the degree to which E 
confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  for a rational agent is equal to 
€ 
x
y
, so long as her 
background beliefs do not favor either hypothesis.  This measure satisfies our two 
constraints since 
€ 
x
y = ∞  when 
€ 
y = 0 and 
€ 
x
y =1 when 
€ 
x = y . 
 Furthermore, this measure has some other intuitively attractive features.  If a 
rational agent is considering two rival hypotheses about the chance of an outcome, and 
the outcome is twice as likely on the first hypothesis as it is on the second hypothesis, 
then (assuming that her background beliefs do not favor either hypothesis), the first 
hypothetical explanation of the outcome seems to be twice as good as the second 
hypothetical explanation of the outcome.  And, by the same reasoning, if an outcome is 
four times as likely on the first hypothesis as it is on the second, then the first 
hypothetical explanation of that outcome seems to be four times as good as the second 
                                                           
67 Since probability 0 events are not necessarily impossible, this constraint implies that the degree to which 
E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  is maximal in some cases in which 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  does not 
rule out y.  I have not motivated this feature of the constraint, but I do not think that it is problematic.   
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hypothetical explanation.  And so on.  That intuition should be, I think, reflected in the 
degree to which one hypothetical explanation is confirmed over another.  The proposed 
measure of  
€ 
x
y  respects that intuition.  However, once again, so do many other measures. 
 I submit that CEM is as follows: 
 Confirmation by Explanation Measure (CEM):  The degree to which E 
 confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  for a rational agent is equal to 
€ 
x
y
, so long 
 as her background beliefs do not favor either hypothesis.  
  
CEM is simple and reasonably intuitive, but unfortunately I know of no argument that 
demonstrates that it, rather than one of an infinitude of other possible measures, is the 
uniquely correct measure.  This is certainly a shortcoming, since the success of the 
derivation depends on what measure we choose.  On the other hand, perhaps the best 
argument that I have correctly identified CEM is that it allows us to derive the PP.  To 
the extent that we are attracted to the general thesis that the PP holds in virtue of the 
explanatory role that objective chance plays, the fact that the particular details of the 
derivation involve the measure I have identified gives us good reason to endorse CEM.68 
 CBCE and CEM give us enough information to determine what abductive 
inference our rational agent will make when she learns that E occurs.  I now turn to the 
additional premises required by the derivation.   
 
3.4. Additional Premises 
 In the last chapter, I argued for an explanation of a particular feature of the 
Principal Principle that I called “SWAMPING”: 
                                                           
68 There may be measures other than the one I have identified as CEM that work just as well in the 
derivation of the PP.  Even if there are such measures, I have no stake in the question of whether they are 
better than CEM.  
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 SWAMPING:  A rational agent’s credences in the chance of an outcome determine 
 her credence in that outcome, so long as she has only admissible information.   
 
I argued that SWAMPING is a consequence of a broader principle (HCP) conjoined with 
the fact that rational agents, in the sorts of cases in which the PP is applicable, are certain 
that the objective chance of an outcome is a hypothetical explanation of that outcome.   
 SWAMPING entails an important fact about the function that determines the value 
of 
€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = x).  According to SWAMPING, so long as a rational agent has only 
admissible information, her credence in E is determined by her credences in the chance 
value of E.  Whatever the particular function is that maps a rational agent’s credence in 
the chance value of E to her credence in E, it is a function solely of x (provided that she 
has only admissible information).  SWAMPING allows us, then, to substitute 
€ 
f (x)  for 
every instance of 
€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = x).   
 As Lewis pointed out, an explanation of the PP that does not stipulate that 
objective chances are probabilities explains why objective chances are probabilities.69  
Dutch book arguments demonstrate that rational credences are described by functions 
that obey the probability calculus, and so the equality given by the PP guarantees that 
objective chances are as well.  On the Lewisian view, whatever the reason is that 
objective chances are related to rational credences as the PP describes is also the reason 
that objective chances are probabilities.      
 The derivation of the PP that follows, unfortunately, does not have this virtue.  In 
particular, I will stipulate that the chance at a time that some outcome obtains at a time is 
equal to a unique real number.  Furthermore, I will stipulate that 
€ 
Cht (E) +Cht (~ E) =1.  
                                                           
69 Lewis (1980) 
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Therefore, the derivation of the PP I offer is not an explanation of every mathematical 
feature of objective chance. 
 That said, these two assumptions are weaker than the stipulation that objective 
chances are probabilities.  In particular, the derivation does not require any assumption 
about additivity.  Furthermore, the stipulations are not entirely mysterious.  First, many 
putatively objective theoretical quantities, such as electric charge, have unique real 
numbered values.  Of course, that is no explanation of why they have such values, but it is 
not a mystery unique to objective chance.   
 Second, that the value of 
€ 
Cht (E)  increases as the value of 
€ 
Cht (~ E)  decreases 
and vice versa, is in keeping with the explanatory role that objective chances play.  
According to CBCE, the higher the value of 
€ 
Cht (E) , the better hypothetical explanation 
of E it is, and the lower the value of 
€ 
Cht (E) , the worse hypothetical explanation of E it 
is.   
 Furthermore, it is plausible that the better a hypothetical explanation explains the 
occurrence of some outcome, the worse it explains the lack of occurrence of that 
outcome.  Consider two rival hypothetical explanations of my leather shoes being 
destroyed.  The first of these is that I left my shoes on the floor and that my dog likes 
chewing anything that is on the floor.  The second is that I left my shoes on the floor and 
my dog has a particular fondness of chewing leather shoes.  The second hypothetical 
explanation is better than the first, but the first is the better hypothetical explanation of 
my shoes not being destroyed (since my dog may have instead chosen to chew on a book 
I left on the floor).  In being a better hypothetical explanation of my shoes being 
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destroyed, the second is a worse hypothetical explanation of my shoes not being 
destroyed.       
 The value of 
€ 
Cht (E) , then, implies something about the hypothetical explanation 
of ~E.  The better of a hypothetical explanation we have for E, the worse of a 
hypothetical explanation we have for ~E, and vice versa.  Since the quality of 
hypothetical explanations tracks chance values, the view that objective chance values are 
hypothetical explanations fits well with the claim that the value of 
€ 
Cht (E)  increases as 
the value of 
€ 
Cht (~ E)  decreases, and vice versa.70 
 
3.5.  The Derivation 
 As before, suppose that some rational agent is considering only two hypotheses 
regarding the chance at some time of outcome E:  the hypothesis that 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  and the 
hypothesis that 
€ 
Cht (E) = y .  Prior to learning that E occurs, our rational agent’s credence 
in each hypothesis is .5.  Furthermore, she has no inadmissible evidence with respect to 
E.71 Now suppose that she becomes certain that E occurs. 
 According to the Principal Principle, an agent’s credence in some outcome is 
equal to the value she takes to be the chance of that outcome, so long as she has no 
inadmissible information.  The goal of this derivation, then, is to show that the value of  
€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = x) must be equal to x.  SWAMPING establishes that the value of 
                                                           
70 We could have set the sum of 
€ 
Cht (E)  and 
€ 
Cht (~ E)  to any value other than 1, just as we could 
reform the probability calculus so that a tautology is assigned a probability other than 1.  The choice is 
nothing more than a scale factor that is selected for the sake of convenience. 
 
71 See Chapter 2 for an account of admissibility. 
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€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = x) is governed by a function (solely) of x.  Let’s call this function           
‘
€ 
f (x) ’.  To derive the PP, then, is to show that 
€ 
f (x) = x .   
 I assume that Bayesian conditionalization accurately describes our rational 
agent’s updating in light of E, and so I assume that her new credence in 
€ 
Cht (E) = x is 
given by Bayes’ theorem: 
 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E) =
Cr(Cht (E) = x)Cr(E |Cht (E) = x)
Cr(E)  
 Our first task is to determine the conditions under which E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  
from the standpoint of Bayesian conditionalization.  I begin by simplifying 
€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = x) and 
€ 
Cr(E) .  As we have seen, SWAMPING allows us to substitute 
€ 
f (x)  for 
€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = x): 
 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E) =
Cr(Cht (E) = x) f (x)
Cr(E)  
Second, I have stipulated that 
€ 
Cht (E)  has a unique value.  Therefore, 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  and 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  form a partition, and so we may apply the theorem of total probability to 
arrive at the value of 
€ 
Cr(E) : 
 
€ 
Cr(E) = Cr(E |Cht (E) = x)Cr(Cht (E) = x) +Cr(E |Cht (E) = y)Cr(Cht (E) = y)  
Let 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x) = p .  Because 
€ 
Cht (E)  has a unique value and our rational agent is 
considering only two hypotheses about the value of 
€ 
Cht (E) , 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = y) =1− p .  
Substituting in p and 
€ 
1− p , I arrive at: 
 
€ 
Cr(E) = Cr(E |Cht (E) = x)p +Cr(E |Cht (E) = y)(1− p)  
By another application of SWAMPING, I substitute
€ 
f (x)  for 
€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = x) and 
€ 
f (y)  
for 
€ 
Cr(E |Cht (E) = y): 
 
€ 
Cr(E) = f (x)p + f (y)(1− p)  
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Thus, Bayes’ theorem can be simplified as follows: 
 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E) =
Cr(Cht (E) = x) f (x)
f (x)p + f (y)(1− p)  
 From the Bayesian perspective, E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  exactly on the condition 
that 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E) is greater than 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x).  In other words, E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  exactly on the condition that 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E)
Cr(Cht (E) = x
>1.  With this in mind, I 
rearrange our simplified version of Bayes’ theorem as follows: 
 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E)
Cr(Cht (E) = x)
=
f (x)
f (x)p + f (y)(1− p)  
Therefore, E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  exactly on the condition that 
€ 
1 < f (x)f (x)p + f (y)(1− p) .  
And, 
€ 
1 < f (x)f (x)p + f (y)(1− p)  if and only if 
€ 
f (x) > f (x)p + f (y)(1− p)  if and only if 
€ 
f (x)(1− p) > f (y)(1− p) .  Since p is the value of a credence, p cannot be greater than 
one.  So, 
€ 
(1− p) ≥ 0 .  It follows that 
€ 
f (x)(1− p) > f (y)(1− p)  if and only if 
€ 
f (x) > f (y).  
Therefore, from the Bayesian perspective, E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  exactly on the 
condition that 
€ 
f (x) > f (y). 
 Recall that the general strategy of the derivation is to use CBCE and CEM to 
determine how the function
€ 
f (x)  must behave if Bayesian updating and abduction give 
compatible descriptions of how our rational agent responds when she learns that E 
occurs.  CBCE provides the conditions under which E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  from the 
perspective of abduction.  According to CBCE, E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  exactly on the 
condition that 
€ 
x > y .  Combining the conditions under which 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  is confirmed as 
arrived at from our simplified version of Bayes’ theorem with the conditions under which 
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€ 
Cht (E) = x  is confirmed as arrived at from CBCE, we have established the following 
important result: 
 
€ 
f (x) > f (y) if and only if 
€ 
x > y  
 Recall that, to derive the PP, I must show that 
€ 
f (x) = x .  The function 
€ 
f (x) = x  
is monotonic, and so it is promising that we have established that 
€ 
f (x) > f (y) if and only 
if 
€ 
x > y .  In so doing, we have shown that 
€ 
f (x)  must be (as we know that it is) 
monotonic. 
 Our next task is to consider a Bayesian measure of the degree to which E 
confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over 
€ 
Cht (E) = y .  I assume that the ratio measure is the correct 
Bayesian measure of confirmation, and so that the degree to which E confirms a 
hypothesis is given by the ratio of the posterior probability of the hypothesis over the 
prior probability of the hypothesis.  The philosophical dispute concerning whether the 
ratio measure is, in fact, the best measure is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but 
there are reasons to think that it is.72  I assume, then, that the degree to which E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  is as follows: 
 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E) ÷Cr(Cht (E) = x)
Cr(Cht (E) = y | E) ÷Cr(Cht (E) = y)
 
Since 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x)=.5, and 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = y) = .5, the measure simplifies to the ratio of 
the posterior probabilities: 
 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E)
Cr(Cht (E) = y | E
 
                                                           
72 See Fitelson (2001). 
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According to CEM, the degree to which E confirms 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  over 
€ 
Cht (E) = y  is 
equal to 
€ 
x
y .  Combining the ratio measure with CEM (with the continued assumption that 
Bayesian updating and abduction are compatible), we arrive at the following equality: 
 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E)
Cr(Cht (E) = y | E
=
x
y  
 Let “n” be a real number greater than zero such that 
€ 
x = ny .  Then, 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E)
Cr(Cht (E) = y | E
=
x
y =
ny
y = n .  By SWAMPING, I substitute 
€ 
f (x)  for 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = x | E) and 
€ 
f (y)  for 
€ 
Cr(Cht (E) = y | E) to arrive at 
€ 
f (x)
f (y) = n .  
Equivalently, 
€ 
f (ny)
f (y) = n , and so 
€ 
f (ny) = nf (y) . 
  Any function over some entire interval of real numbers that satisfies 
€ 
f (nz) = nf (z) and is monotonic is such that 
€ 
f (z) = mz  (over the interval for which f is 
well defined) for some real number m.73 Thus, we have shown that 
€ 
f (x) = mx . 
 Our final task is to demonstrate that 
€ 
f (x) = x  by showing that 
€ 
m =1.  Credences 
are probabilities, so the following equality holds: 
 
€ 
Cr(E |Ch(E) = x) +Cr(~ E |Ch(E) = x) =1   
By SWAMPING, we may substitute 
€ 
f (x)  for 
€ 
Cr(E |Ch(E) = x) to arrive at: 
 
€ 
f (x) +Cr(~ E |Ch(E) = x) =1 
Recall that I stipulated that 
€ 
Cht (E) +Cht (~ E) =1.  It follows that 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  if and 
only if 
€ 
Cht (~ E) =1− x .  Substituting 
€ 
Cht (~ E) =1− x  for 
€ 
Cht (E) = x  yields the 
following: 
                                                           
73 Godement (2004) 
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€ 
f (x) +Cr(~ E |Ch(~ E) = (1− x)) =1 
Again, by SWAMPING, the function that yields the value of 
€ 
Cr(~ E |Ch(~ E) = (1− x)) is 
a function solely of 
€ 
(1− x) and so I substitute 
€ 
f (1− x)  for 
€ 
Cr(~ E |Ch(~ E) = (1− x))  to 
arrive at: 
 
€ 
f (x) + f (1− x) =1 
We have already shown that 
€ 
f (x) = mx , and so it follows that: 
 
€ 
mx +m(1− x) = mx +m −mx = m =1 
Thus, we have solved for m and demonstrated that 
€ 
m =1.  Having shown that 
€ 
f (x) = mx  
and that 
€ 
m =1, we have proven that the function that yields the value of
€ 
Cr(E |Ch(E) = x) must be such that 
€ 
f (x) = x .  Therefore we have shown that, so long 
as a rational agent has no inadmissible information, her rational credence in an outcome 
equals what she takes to be the chance value of that outcome, and so have derived the 
Principal Principle. 
 
3.6.  Conclusion 
 We were initially interested in the Principal Principle because an especially heavy 
burden for a theory of chance is to explain why chances are a guide to life.  We have now 
seen that the Principal Principle may be derived from SWAMPING, CBCE, CEM, and the 
assumptions that chance values are unique real numbers and that 
€ 
Cht (E) +Cht (~ E) =1.  
All of these assumptions can be motivated by the explanatory role that chances play.  
Three of these assumptions (SWAMPING, CBCE, CEM) can only be true if objective 
chances are hypothetical explanations of their outcomes (in cases where the PP is meant 
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to apply).74  If, as I maintain, this derivation explains why the PP is true, then two 
important consequences for a theory of chance follow. 
 First, contrary to the received view, a non-reductive theory of chance can ground 
the Principal Principle.  This derivation of the Principal Principle is important for a non-
reductive theorist because the only assumption it makes about what chances are (as 
opposed to what they do) is that chances are uniquely real-valued.  As we saw in Chapter 
1, a non-reductive theory is perfectly suited to allow that chances serve as hypothetical 
explanations of their outcomes, and so a non-reductive theory can explain the Principal 
Principle by pointing to the explanatory role that chances play for rational agents.      
 Second, this derivation of the PP places a burden on all other theories of chance to 
allow that chances are explanatory.  We have already seen reasons to doubt that Humean 
frequency theories of chance can explain the PP with an appeal to a metaphysical 
relationship between chances and their outcomes.  Furthermore, we have noted that both 
Humean frequency theories and causal propensity theories have a prima facie difficulty 
allowing that chances are hypothetical explanations of their outcomes.75  Unless reductive 
theories of chance can either establish that chances are explanatory or provide an 
independent explanation of the Principal Principle, they are non-starters.  This derivation 
of the PP, then, gives the non-reductive theory a significant advantage over its reductive 
competitor.
                                                           
74 Strictly speaking, all that is required is that chances play an explanatory role for rational agents.  But, I 
think that the most philosophically important case is one in which chances are hypothetical explanations.  
See Chapter 2, section 6 for a full discussion. 
 
75 See Chapter 1. 
4. Mereological Supervenience and Synchronic Chance 
4.1. Introduction 
 The aim of the last two chapters was to provide an explanation of the Principal 
Principle that is amenable to a non-reductive theory of chance but that puts pressure on 
reductive theories of chance.  The central aim of this chapter is to argue for the existence 
of objective “synchronic” chances.  If there are such chances, then the non-reductive 
theory has an advantage over causal propensity theories.76  The argument that there are 
objective synchronic chances requires a detour through an investigation into the 
relationship between the “macro-properties” discovered by non-fundamental sciences and 
the “micro-properties” of fundamental physics.  
 The properties of an object that interest a researcher from one discipline may 
differ wildly from the properties that interest a researcher from another discipline.  Still, 
we do not think that the properties that are the proper subject of one science are utterly 
divorced from those of another science.  One intuitive view of how these properties relate 
is that the more “macro” properties of an object (like the biological properties of a horse) 
are determined by less “macro” properties (like the chemical properties of a horse) and so 
on until we come to the fundamental physical “micro” properties.  This view is referred 
to as “Mereological Supervenience”, or “MS”.  Though MS is prima facie appealing, I 
argue that it is false by presenting a series of counterexamples.  Happily, the very same 
                                                           
76 See Chapter 1. 
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examples that show that MS is wrong also suggest a replacement that not only 
accommodates the cases MS struggles with but also nicely explains those that it seemed 
to handle well.   
 Replacing MS in favor of this view has two interesting and important (if perhaps 
not universally welcome) consequences.  First, and most relevant the argument for my 
non-reductive theory, the view entails that there is an objective synchronic probability 
distribution according to which the chance at a time of some event at that very time may 
be neither 0 nor 1.   Second, if MS is false then a popular and persuasive argument 
concerning the ontological status of the chances referred to in sciences other than 
fundamental physics is unsound 
 
4.2. Mereological Supervenience  
 Consider some individual with blue eyes.  That her eyes are blue seems 
determined by the chemical properties of her irises (in particular the ratio of eumelanin in 
each iris).  Her irises’ chemical properties seem determined by their atomic properties, 
which are themselves determined by lower level properties and so on until we arrive at 
the properties of her eyes that feature in the fundamental physical laws.77   
                                                           
77 The argument for MS often takes this step-wise feature.  The reason, for instance, that we suppose that 
facts about groups of people supervene on microphysical facts is that facts about groups of people 
supervene on psychological facts, which supervene on biological facts, which supervene on chemical facts 
and so on to the microphysical level.  Accordingly, when I describe counterexamples to MS, I focus on the 
relationship between a macrostate and a state that is somewhat less macro, rather than on the relationship 
between a macrostate and a state with properties that figure in the laws of fundamental physics.  Often, 
then, I will refer to some state as a “microstate” even though its properties are not those mentioned in 
micro-physics, but rather those referred to by some higher level science that is nevertheless a lower level 
science than is the one that corresponds to the macrostate.  One might worry about this shortcut since from 
the fact that an upper level macrostate fails to supervene on a middle level macrostate it does not follow 
that the upper level macrostate fails to supervene on the most fundamental microstate.  Let me say 
explicitly, then, that I believe that the cases I will examine are counterexamples to MS irrespective of 
whether the “microstate” in question is a fundamental microstate. For example, it is only for ease of 
exegesis that I allow myself to refer to a description of a gas in terms of the positions and velocities of its 
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 Similarly, the fact that the particles of a gas have certain masses and velocities 
seems to determine the gas’s temperature, and the fact that an individual is in a certain 
brain state seems to determine that she is in pain.  The examples are easy to multiply.  In 
general, it seems that if two systems are identical on the micro- level, they are identical at 
all other levels.   
 These considerations suggest the following thesis that I call (following Elliott 
Sober) “Mereological Supervenience”.78 
 (MS):  The microstate of a system at a time determines the macrostate of that 
 system at that time.   
As it stands, this thesis requires precisification.  There are many ways to define 
“microstate” and “macrostate”, and MS may turn out to be both substantive and true on 
some of these definitions.  However, we are here interested in only the particular reading 
of MS that is suggested by the examples above and which (as we will see) figures in a 
broader dispute.  We will understand a “microstate” to be a state of a physical system 
characterized by an exhaustive list of its intrinsic fundamental physical properties, and a 
“macrostate” to be a state of a physical system characterized by any collection of the 
system’s intrinsic properties that do not feature in the fundamental physical laws.   
 The term “determine” also calls for clarification.  The sense in which microstates 
“determine” macrostates (on the reading of MS that we are concerned with) is one in 
which no two systems in the same microstate under the same laws of nature (be they two 
                                                           
molecules as a “microstate”, rather than reserving the label “microstate” for its quantum-mechanical state.  
If it turned out that appeal to fundamental microstates somehow dissolved my counterexamples, then this 
would be an interesting result – but there would still be a possible world, superficially similar to the actual 
world, where my result holds. 
 
78 My formulation of MS is slightly different from Sober’s (2010). 
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systems in the same possible world or two systems in two different possible worlds) may 
differ with respect to their macrostates.  If MS is true, then any two systems that are 
identical with respect to their intrinsic microphysical properties at some time are identical 
with respect to their intrinsic macro-physical properties at that time, so long as the same 
laws govern both systems.79    
 I will argue that MS is false by presenting several counterexamples to it.  Because 
many of us are confident in the truth of MS, skepticism is a natural reaction to my cases.  
Therefore it is important to distinguish between merely apparently counterexamples to 
MS and genuine counterexamples (with the implication that those to come are of the 
genuine variety). 
 There are countless illusory “counterexamples” that can be generated by 
misidentifying a system’s microstate or macrostate. Consider, for example, a piece of 
paper with ink placed on it in such a way that it reads “Philosophy Department”.  In one 
scenario, imagine that a person placed the ink there in order to make a sign. In a second 
scenario, imagine that the paper and ink are molecule for molecule the same as in the 
first, but that the ink got there coincidentally by being spilled.  It is natural enough to 
think that there is a macro-level difference between these two sheets of paper: the first 
sheet has a message on it and the second does not.  But the two sheets of paper are 
identical on the micro-level, so we have a case in which two systems are in identical 
microstates though they have different macro-level properties. 
                                                           
79 For simplicity I will often leave the reference to the physical laws implicit and describe MS as the view 
that microstates determine macrostates. 
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 It is unlikely that anyone will be taken in by this “counterexample”.  The 
argument goes wrong by ignoring that being a message is a relational property.80  We no 
more suspect that the macro-property of being a message supervenes on the micro-
properties of the paper and ink than we suppose that my being taller than my mother 
supervenes on just my micro-properties.  The moral is that special care must be given to 
distinguishing between intrinsic and relational macro-properties. 
 Finally, the philosophical upshot of the counterexamples that follow does not 
depend on the details of any particular one of them being true of the actual world.  My 
examples involve concepts such as “volume” (from thermodynamics) and “fitness” (from 
evolutionary biology), and though my analyses of these concepts are drawn from the 
disciplines in which they are used, a thorough treatment of any one of them deserves 
much more care than it will receive here.  Accordingly, my cases should be thought of as 
describing ways that the world could be and as demonstrating that there are possible 
worlds that look a great deal like our own in which MS is false.  Whether or not I have 
actually done justice to the intricacies of volume, fitness, and other properties of our 
world is not a matter that I think I need to settle here.  If somehow one of my examples 
ultimately falls afoul of those details, I do not expect that such a piecemeal approach to 
rejecting my cases will be available for each of the counterexamples I give here and other 
similar examples. 
 
 
 
                                                           
80I presume that a piece of paper is a message partly in virtue of its relation to the intentions and beliefs of 
agents. 
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4.3.  A Counterexample from Thermodynamics 
 Consider a five-liter box of gas.  Assuming that it is appropriately isolated, the 
laws of thermodynamics govern the time-evolution of its macrostate, which includes such 
properties as its pressure, volume, and temperature.  In particular, let us suppose that the 
volume of this gas is five-liters, and refer to this macrostate as ‘F’ for ‘five’.  At the 
micro-level, the gas is a swarm of individual particles that are constantly moving at 
different velocities and occupying different positions. We will assume that the gas is 
appropriately isolated, that the evolution of its microstate is governed by Newtonian 
mechanics, and that its microstate at any moment is given by a specification of the 
locations and velocities and additional intrinsic properties of its particles.    
 According to MS, the gas’s volume is determined by the gas’s microstate 
(together with the laws), but MS leaves the details of this relationship a mystery.  For 
example, it is obvious that the gas’s volume cannot merely equal the sum of the volumes 
of its particles (conceiving of them as spherical solids), since the sum of the gas particles’ 
volumes is vanishingly small compared to the gas’s volume.81   
 Instead, the volume of the smallest possible boundary around the gas particles at a 
time might determine the gas’s volume.  But this strategy, too, will obviously not work.  
At any time, the gas particles dispersed throughout the container will typically not be 
adjacent to the container’s sides, and so the volume of a boundary around these particles 
will be smaller than the gas’s volume.   
 In fact, it is hard to see how any strategy that attempts to read off the gas’s 
volume from the positions and velocities of its particles at a time could be successful.  
                                                           
81 For simplicity I ignore the fact that particles are not spherical solids, and that it is far from clear how one 
might determine their volume.   
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After all, the gas’s volume at equilibrium must, by definition, remain constant.  But we 
also think that the positions and velocities of the gas’s particles at equilibrium constantly 
fluctuate.  None of these variations, however, tempt us to conclude that a typical gas’s 
volume is correspondingly fluctuating over time.  Accordingly, it is hard to see how a 
particular configuration of its particles can determine its volume since any feature of a 
given configuration is susceptible to vanishing over time even as the gas’s volume 
remains constant.    
 Nor will it help to consider the configuration of a gas’s particles over an extended 
period of time.  For example, we expect that the volume of the smallest possible single 
boundary around the space that the gas’s particles occupy over some sufficiently long 
span of time will equal the volume of the container.  But though that is what is reasonable 
to expect, the gas particles need not behave that way.  It might be that none of the 
particles during any given span of time happens to venture into one of the corners of the 
container.  That would be very unlikely, but no matter how long a span of time we 
choose, nothing precludes such an odd occurrence.  It is no easier to see how the volume 
of a gas is determined by a configuration of its particles over time than it is to see how the 
volume is determined by a configuration at an instant. 
 Of course, none of these reflections shows that there is not some way in which the 
volume of a gas is determined by its microstate.  The important moral to draw (and one 
that I will exploit later in my positive account) is that given a gas’s volume, there are 
many ways a gas’s particles may be configured, and some of these configurations are 
more likely than others. 
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 Suppose that, for an instant, the particles of our five-liter gas find themselves 
bunched into a corner of our container.  Let us call this microstate ‘b’, for ‘bunched’.  
Now it would be very unusual for the particles of a five-liter gas to be bunched together 
for an instant.  It is much more likely, according to the statistical mechanical 
interpretation of thermodynamics, that the particles are dispersed throughout the box.  
Nevertheless it is possible for a system in F to be in b.  If microstates determine 
macrostates, as MS has it, then the fact that the system is in b determines that it is in F. 
 Now consider a smaller box of gas.  Suppose that the volume of this box is just 
large enough to contain particles arranged into microstate b.  The gas in this box is also 
overwhelmingly likely to be evenly dispersed throughout its container (as it would be in 
b).  Imagine that this smaller box is one-liter and thus that the volume of the gas in the 
box is also one-liter.  Call this macrostate ‘O’, for ‘one’.  Suppose that the particles of the 
gas in macrostate O find themselves, for an instant, arranged into b.  This is just the sort 
of microstate that it is likely for a gas of O’s volume to be in (which, as I will explain, 
appears to be the only relevant difference between the gas’s being in O and its being in 
F).82  If microstates determine macrostates, then the fact that the system is in b 
determines that it is in O. 
 Suppose that the particles of some gas are arranged into microstate b.  What is its 
volume?  A safe bet is that it is a one-liter gas, but if the above reasoning is correct, it 
could be a five-liter gas that is momentarily in an unusual type of microstate.  We have 
seen that a gas in microstate b could be either a one-liter gas in the sort of microstate it is 
                                                           
82 Of course, one would not expect that the system is in b, or in any other particular microstate, since the 
chance of any particular microstate obtaining is incredibly small.  Rather, b is the kind of microstate one 
would expect to find a one-liter gas in, since it is a microstate in which the molecules of gas are more or 
less evenly distributed throughout the container.    
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likely to be in, or a five-liter gas in a very unlikely sort of microstate.  The case described 
above is one in which two systems are in identical microstates at time but are 
nevertheless in different macrostates at that time.  Thus, contra MS, the microstate of a 
gas does not determine its macrostate. 
 No doubt those sympathetic to MS will have some objections to my 
counterexample.  Two immediately come to mind.  The first denies that the gas really is a 
five-liter gas when it is in b, and the second is that I have misidentified the macrostate of 
the gas.  Let’s consider them in turn. 
 Objection 1: It is essential to the argument that b be a microstate that is 
consistent with the system being in either F or O.  But b is consistent only with O.  At the 
moment that the gas in the five- liter container is in b , the gas is no longer five-liters.  Of 
course, we might ignore such fluctuations for pragmatic reasons and call the gas a “five-
liter” gas (since in a moment it will probably be one) but strictly speaking the gas’s 
volume is only one-liter at when it is in b.   
 Kinetic-molecular theory attempts to explain truths about the macro-level 
behavior of gases (such as the relationship between temperature, volume, and pressure) 
from the behavior of their constituent particles.  For example, one may derive Boyle’s 
law (which states that a gas’s pressure and volume under constant temperature are 
inversely proportional) by using kinetic-molecular theory.  To entail this law, the theory 
must make some assumptions about gases that are violated (to various degrees) by actual 
gases, and so the behavior of actual gases deviates somewhat (though sometimes to a 
negligible degree) from Boyle’s law.   
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 One assumption of kinetic-molecular theory interests us in particular.  Here it is as 
expressed by Clausius83: 
In the first place, it is requisite that the force with which all the molecules at their 
mean distances attract each other, vanish when compared with the expansive force 
due to the motion.  But the molecules are not always at their mean distances 
asunder; on the contrary, during their motion a molecule is often brought into 
close proximity to another, or to a fixed surface consisting of active molecules, 
and in such moments the molecular forces will of course commence their activity.  
The second condition requires, therefore, that those parts of the path described by 
a molecule under the influence of the molecular forces, when the later are capable 
of altering appreciably the direction or velocity of the molecule’s motion, should 
vanish when compared with those parts of its path with respect to which the 
influence of these forces may be regarded as zero.  
 
 In other words, to derive Boyle’s law, one needs to assume that the gas particles 
have no significant influence on one another, and to do this, one must assume that each 
particle spends the majority of its path far enough away from other particles that the 
influence of intermolecular forces is negligible.  This condition precludes one way in 
which the gas particles may be bunched together.  That is, this condition precludes their 
spending a significant amount of their time bunched tightly enough that their force on one 
another becomes significant. 
 What this assumption shows is that a gas’s volume is not sufficient to preclude its 
being in particular kinds of bunched microstates, since a gas’s being a certain volume 
does not preclude its molecules from being so bunched that they exert significant force 
upon one another.  To rule out this possibility, we must make the assumption that the 
molecules stay far enough apart for long enough.  But if our objector were correct that no 
gas can be in a microstate that is bunched with respect to its volume, then this assumption 
would be superfluous!  If a gas’s being five-liters already prohibited its particles from 
                                                           
83 Clausius (1857) 
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being together in a one-liter space, then there would be no need to make the additional 
assumption that the molecules are not bunched so tightly that their molecular forces are 
non-negligible. 
 This is just one way that the kinetic-molecular theory of gasses conflicts with the 
treatment of volume advocated in Objection 1, but there are more.  For example, 
“equilibrium” in thermodynamics is defined as a period in which the temperature, 
pressure, and volume of a gas do not change.  Normally we treat a gas that has been 
properly isolated for a long enough period of time as being at equilibrium, but the volume 
of a five-liter box of gas may (by the objector’s lights) change its volume at any moment, 
regardless of how long it has been appropriately isolated.  So if the objector is correct, 
isolated gases are always only probably going to stay at equilibrium.  While it seems right 
that most actual gases often fluctuate in and out of equilibrium despite our best efforts, it 
seems very odd that there are no macro-constraints that a theoretical gas can be put in 
that ensure that it is at equilibrium.  Of course, we could avoid this worry by redefining 
equilibrium as a state in which a gas is overwhelmingly likely to not change its 
thermodynamic properties, but again this would require an amendment to kinetic-
molecular theory.  In short, it seems that sustaining Objection 1 requires amendment to 
our scientific theories.  Such amendments are good to forestall unless absolutely 
necessary, and since (as we will see) my replacement for MS does not require them, it is 
better to accept the counterexample to MS then to side with Objection 1. 
 Objection 2:  The counterexample supposes that volume is an intrinsic property of 
a gas, and so microstate b includes the positions and velocities of the particles that 
compose the gas, but not the positions and velocities of the particles that compose the 
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box.  However, the gas’s volume is actually a relational property of the gas that is 
determined in part by the container's volume. This “counterexample” makes the same 
mistake that was made by the “counterexample” in Section 1. 
 It is indisputable that there is a sense in which a gas’s container determines the 
gas’s volume when the gas is in equilibrium.   But the above objection equivocates on 
“determines” by mistaking a causal relationship for a constitutive one.  The container’s 
volume certainly causes the gas’s volume to be what it is.  After all, the container traps 
the gas molecules in such a way that the gas is prevented from expanding.  That said, 
what constitutes the gas’s having a certain volume is completely independent of anything 
to do with containers.  Having a particular volume, unlike being a message, is an intrinsic 
property, not a relational property between gases and their containers.  Unlike the case in 
Section 1, the appropriate supervenience base for the property of having a particular 
volume (if MS is true) does not include information about the particles that compose the 
container.   
 It can be difficult to distinguish causal relationships from constitutive ones, so to 
clarify the role that containers play with respect to volume, consider volume as it applies 
to other entities besides gases.  Take, for example, the relationship between the volume of 
a solid and its container.  None of us is tempted to think that a solid’s volume is partially 
constituted by its container.  We would not include information about the microstate of a 
solid’s container in the supervenience base for a solid’s volume.  A gas’s volume is no 
less intrinsic than a solid’s, so it is not partly constituted by the gas’s container.  Why, 
then, are we more tempted to think of a gas’s volume than of a solid’s volume as partially 
constituted by its container?  I propose that it is because a solid’s container does not help 
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to cause its volume.  Nevertheless, just as we treat a solid’s volume as among its intrinsic 
properties, so too we should understand a gas’s volume as among its intrinsic properties. 
 
4.4.  A Counterexample from Evolutionary Biology 
 A single counterexample suffices to demonstrate that MS is false.  However, if 
there is only one candidate counterexample to MS, then it is tempting to suppose that 
fault lies with the particulars of the case rather than with MS.  Perhaps the problem is 
generated by some conceptual confusion or peculiarity within thermodynamics.  We 
might reasonably consider it more likely, for example, that our scientific concept of 
volume needs revision than that MS is false.  But counterexamples to MS are not unique 
to thermodynamics.  There are other cases that have the same structure, and so the 
success of the counterexamples does not rest on any idiosyncrasy of a particular case.  
My second example is drawn from evolutionary biology. 
 An organism’s Darwinian “fitness” is a property that reflects its ability to 
reproduce.  The higher an organism’s fitness, the more copies of its genes we expect to 
find in subsequent generations.  Most philosophers and biologists have given “fitness” a 
probabilistic interpretation, partly to respect the intuition that an organism with high 
fitness may nevertheless, because of “bad luck”, fail to pass on many copies of its genes 
(or, because of “good luck”, may pass on many more copies of its genes than is 
expected).  What this probabilistic interpretation amounts to is heavily disputed, but it is 
widely agreed that a creature’s having a high fitness is consistent with its not actually 
leaving many (or any) copies of its genes behind at all. 
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 Whether an organism is fit depends on more than just its intrinsic features.  For 
example, a butterfly’s capacity for flight (which is an important contributor to its fitness) 
depends not only on some of its intrinsic features (such as wingspan), but also on its 
extrinsic properties.  Two butterflies that are intrinsically identical but live in different 
climates may nevertheless differ with respect to their ability to fly (since warmer climates 
are more conducive to flight in coldblooded creatures than are cooler climates), and so 
differ with respect to their fitness. 
 Suppose that some butterfly lives in an environment with a climate that is optimal 
for its flying capabilities.  For simplicity, let us focus exclusively on the contribution that 
climate makes toward the butterfly’s ability to fly, and on the contribution that flight 
makes to the butterfly’s overall fitness.84  Let us call this butterfly’s fitness “H”, for 
“high”.  Tragically, a falling tree kills our butterfly after being alive for only a single day.  
As it happens, the temperature this day is 70 degrees Fahrenheit. 
 Imagine a second butterfly that lives in an environment largely the same as the 
first, but with a climate less suited to flight.  Again for simplicity, let us focus only on the 
contribution that climate makes to flight and that flight makes to overall fitness, and so 
assume that our two butterflies would be equally fit if they were born in the same climate.  
However, since the second is born in a cooler climate, its fitness is lower than the first 
butterfly’s.  Call this fitness level “L” for “low relative to the first butterfly’s”.  A tree 
also kills this butterfly after being alive for only a single day.  That day’s temperature is 
70 degrees Fahrenheit, which is unusually warm for the climate. 
                                                           
84 As is hopefully obvious, the choice to focus on flight and climate, rather than, say, speed and terrain, is 
entirely arbitrary.   
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 It is consistent with our story that the two butterflies themselves are (intrinsically) 
identical on the micro-level at every instant of their existence.  Of course, that fact itself 
does not threaten MS since, as we have already seen, fitness is a relational property of an 
organism.85  
 But MS is threatened by the fact that it is consistent with our story that not only 
the butterflies themselves but also their actual environments are identical on the micro-
level.  The difference in the two scenarios in virtue of which the two butterflies have 
different levels of fitness is (we have stipulated) the different climates.  But the climate of 
the environment is not, contra MS, determined by the microstate of the environment.  
Even though the climate in the second case is cooler than in the first case, it may 
nevertheless be that the temperature on the sole day of our butterflies’ lives is the same in 
both scenarios.  At the micro-level, our two butterflies and the environments they find 
themselves in may be indistinguishable over the course of their lives, even though one 
butterfly has a higher fitness than the other.   
 Though the microstates themselves may be identical in the two scenarios, our 
expectations about them are not.  Given that a system is in H, it is likely that that system 
is in a microstate that would probably result in the butterfly’s leaving behind many copies 
of its genes.  Given that a system is in L, it is somewhat less likely that that system is in a 
microstate that would probably result in the butterfly’s leaving behind many copies of its 
genes.  Structurally, the fitness case is very similar to the gas case: we are presented with 
two systems that are in different macrostates but the same microstate, and the only 
(relevant) difference between the systems appears to be that one system is in a likely kind 
                                                           
85 To expect fitness to supervene on the microstate of the organism, rather than on the microstates of the 
organism and its environment, is to make the same mistake that was illustrated by the unsuccessful 
“counterexample” in section 1. 
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of microstate while the other system is in a less likely kind of microstate (though the 
microstates themselves are the same). 
 Someone might respond that if the climates are truly different in the two 
scenarios, this difference must show up on the micro-level.  Here is one way that worry 
might go:  
 Objection 3: All that this case shows is that fitness does not supervene on the 
microstates that span an organism’s lifetime.  But fitness supervenes on the sequence of 
microstates considered over a longer period of time.  For example, if we consider a 
sufficiently long sequence of microstates, we will see that the temperatures in the two 
cases are eventually different, since the two climates are different.  This difference in 
temperature will correspond to a micro-level difference in the environments. 
 We faced an analogous worry when we were developing the gas case, and my 
response is similar.  While it is very likely that there will be a temperature difference if 
we consider a long span of time, surely it is not necessary.  The fact that the two climates 
are different is consistent with their having identical temperatures for as many days as we 
can imagine.  Rainy climates suffer draughts, cold climates have unseasonably warm 
stretches, and deserts go through cold spells.  Of course, the longer the odd weather lasts 
the less likely it becomes, but at no point does it become impossible.   
 It is uncontroversial that if one witnessed (say) 10,000 consecutive cold days in a 
supposedly warm climate, one may reasonably question whether the area was actually 
warm!  Similarly, if one witnesses a supposedly fair coin land heads 10,000 times, one 
may reasonably question whether the coin is fair.  But just as the fact that it is reasonable 
to believe of such a coin that it is not fair does not ensure that it is fair, so too the fact that 
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it is reasonable to believe that this climate is cold fails to ensure that the climate actually 
is cold.  And, just as one can imagine a fair coin that lands heads 10,000 times (or one 
million times, or an infinite number of times), so one can also imagine a warm climate 
that has a long consecutive string of cold days.       
 Furthermore, we can (brutally) cut the objection off before it begins by adding to 
the case the supposition that the Earth (and the Universe, if we like) pops into existence 
when the butterflies are born and ceases to exist when they die.  On this version of the 
case, there are no further facts about the temperature on other days, since there are no 
other days.  Still, even if the planet existed for only a day, the butterfly’s fitness would be 
high in one case and low in the other.   
 
4.5.  A Counterexample From Economics 
 The above two counterexamples to MS follow the same general recipe.  We start 
with a macrostate that usually obtains in conjunction with one kind of microstate, but can 
obtain in conjunction with another kind of microstate.  We then consider whether that 
unusual kind of microstate is consistent with any other macrostates.  If it is, then we have 
the makings for a counterexample to MS, since we have identified a microstate that is 
consistent with two (non-compatible) macrostates.  I suspect that applying this general 
recipe across various disciplines will yield counterexamples to MS that vary widely in 
subject matter but are structurally identical.  As further evidence, let’s consider one final 
case. 
 Economic markets are composed of (generally) large numbers of individuals 
engaged in financial transactions.  For simplicity, let us think of the microstate of an 
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economic market as a list of these transactions over some period of time.86  The 
microstate of the stock market relative to some particular stock over the course of a year, 
then, is a list of individuals and the price at which they bought or sold that stock for each 
time they did so over the course of that year.   
 The “market price” of a particular investment is a property that reflects the actual 
price at which that investment was bought or sold, or an average of the actual price of 
that investment over some number of transactions.  The market price of an investment is 
the sort of thing one can learn by opening a newspaper or watching a stock market ticker.  
Clearly the market price of an investment supervenes on the list of individual transactions 
involving that investment, since the market price is either identical to the actual price of 
that investment or to an average over the actual prices established by multiple 
transactions.87 
 The “true value” of an investment (tellingly, for our purposes, referred to as the 
“equilibrium price” in some discussions) bears a more complicated relationship to the 
microstate of a market.  Because information is not perfectly and instantly transferred 
among individuals in actual markets, the market price (which is determined by the 
market’s microstate) and true value of an investment often differ.  A market that has 
achieved the true value for some investment no longer has any (non-random) tendency 
for its market price to fluctuate, so long as other facts (such as supply and demand) are 
                                                           
86 For ease of exposition, I assume that the behavior of individuals with respect to financial transactions 
supervenes on the fundamental physical properties of that system. 
 
87 I do not mean to suggest that the process of determining the market price of a particular investment is a 
straightforward matter. Companies and market analysts use extremely complicated techniques to decide at 
what price they will offer investments, and market forces influence the price from that point. 
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held fixed.88  Actual markets may never reach this state because individuals rarely have 
complete information, and it takes time for them to move the market price toward the true 
value.  And, since the true value of investments changes frequently over time, many 
actual markets never reach true value.  
 An analogy with statistical thermodynamics is illustrative.  We may think of the 
individual investment exchanges as being like the positions of individual gas particles, 
and of the market value of an investment at a time or over some span of time as being 
like the volume of the smallest possible boundary that contains the positions of the gas 
particles at a time or over some span of time.  The volume of a gas plainly does not 
supervene on the positions of individual gas particles at an instant.  Likewise, the true 
value of an investment plainly does not supervene on its market price at an instant.  But a 
natural (if incorrect) thought in the thermodynamics case is that a gas’s volume 
supervenes on the volume of the smallest possible boundary that contains the positions of 
the gas particles over a long enough span of time.  Similarly, it is natural to suppose that 
the true value of an investment supervenes on the market price of an investment over a 
span of time that is long enough for the individuals in that market to acquire complete 
information. 
 However, just as it is possible (albeit hugely unlikely) for the volume of a gas to 
differ from the volume of the smallest possible boundary around the positions of its 
particles over an arbitrarily long span of time, so too is it possible for the true value of an 
investment to differ from its market price even when the individual actors have complete 
information.  An “efficient market” is one in which all information, public and private, is 
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reflected in the market price of an investment.  Aswath Damodaran explains an efficient 
market as follows, 
An efficient market is one where the market price is an unbiased estimate of the 
true value of the investment… Contrary to popular view, market efficiency does 
not require that the market price be equal to the true value at every point in time.  
All it requires is that errors in the market price be unbiased; prices can be greater 
than or less than true value, as long as these deviations are random.89   
 
Over a sufficiently long span of time, then, it is overwhelmingly likely that the market 
value of an investment in an efficient market will match the true value of that investment.  
Nevertheless, it is possible, albeit hugely unlikely, for the market price of an investment 
to differ from its true value no matter how long a span of time we choose. 
 Now we have the ingredients for a counterexample to MS.  Consider an efficient 
market in which the market price of some investment over some arbitrarily long span of 
time is a certain value.  Call the macrostate that corresponds to having that market price 
M, for “market price”.  Suppose that the microstate of this market is given by a complete 
list of the economic transactions of the individuals that compose that market.  Call this 
microstate “i”, for “individuals”.  As before, I assume that M supervenes on i since the 
price associated with M is an average over the actual price set by each transaction as 
described by i.  Finally suppose that this efficient market has, surprisingly, undervalued 
the investment, and that it’s true value is higher than its market price.  Let “TH” stand for 
the macrostate that corresponds to having that true value.  Given that the system is in TH 
over an arbitrarily long span of time, it is very surprising that it is in a microstate such as 
i.  It is much more likely for the microstate of that system to be one that is consistent with 
the investment’s market price equaling its true value.  Nevertheless, it is possible for a 
system to be in both TH and i.   
                                                           
89 Damodaran (2002) 
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 Now consider a second efficient market in which the market price of the 
investment is the same as in the first, but whose true value matches the market price.  
Call this true value macrostate “TM”.  If it is possible for a market in TH to be in i and M, 
it is certainly possible for a market in TM to be in i and M.  After all, i is precisely the sort 
of microstate we would expect to obtain given that the market is in TM.  But now we have 
a counterexample to MS.  We have two markets that are identical at the micro-level, 
since both are in i (and M), but differ with respect to the macro-level, since the first is in 
TH and the second is in TM.         
 One might object to this counterexample on the grounds that true value is not, in 
fact, an intrinsic property of markets.  Consider the following worry. 
 Objection 4:  The counterexample supposes that true value is an intrinsic property 
of an efficient market, and so microstate i includes the transactions of the individuals that 
compose that market, but does not include micro-level facts that other market forces 
supervene on.  However, true value is actually a relational property of a market that is 
determined, in part, by additional market forces such as supply and demand.  This 
“counterexample” makes the same mistake that was made by the “counterexample” in 
Section 1. 
 This objection is analogous to the second objection leveled against the case from 
thermodynamics.  Just as one might see volume as a relational property between a gas 
and its container, one might see true value as a relational property between a market and 
the forces that act on that market.  And, just as it is uncontroversial that there is a sense in 
which the gas’s container determines its volume, it is uncontroversial that there
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in which forces such as supply and demand help to determine true value.  The question is 
whether that determination relationship is causal or constitutive.  
 The objector maintains that what it is for an investment to have some particular 
true value is, in part, for various facts about supply and demand to obtain.  So, what it is 
for the market to be in TH is partly for suppliers to be willing and able to sell a particular 
quantity of that investment.  Settling whether or not this is the correct view of true value 
requires work in the philosophy of economics that is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  For now I merely note that factors such as the ability of a supplier to 
produce a certain quantity of a type of investment strike me as the sorts of things that 
cause an investment to have the true value it does, not that partially constitute the 
property of having a particular true value.   
 The important dialectical point is that, if MS is true, then true value must be a 
property partly constituted by, among other things, facts about supply and demand.  The 
advocate of MS, because of her metaphysical view, precludes the possibility that our best 
philosophy of economics establishes that true value is caused by, not constituted by, 
supply and demand.  I suggest that instead of taking such a metaphysically hard line, we 
adopt a more flexible theory of the relationship between macrostates and microstates that 
leaves such questions open.          
             
4.6. Replacing Mereological Supervenience 
 If a system’s microstate does not determine its macrostate, what does?  The 
counterexamples to MS that I have given are structurally similar.  This similarity suggests 
a promising replacement for MS.  In the thermodynamics case we considered a five-liter 
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box of gas (a box in state “F”) and a one-liter box of gas (a box in state “O”) and noted 
that these two macrostates are consistent with the same microstate (“b” for “bunched”).  
As we saw, the chance of a system’s being in one or another of the “bunched” 
microstates is lower for a system in F than for a system in O.  In the evolutionary biology 
case, we noted that a butterfly’s having a high fitness (“H”) and its having a low fitness 
(“L”) are both consistent with the micro-physical details of their lives.  But the likelihood 
of our butterfly’s living the sort of life it does is higher when the system is in L than when 
it is in H.  In the economics case, we saw that an efficient market in microstate i may 
have investments with market prices that match the true value (and so be in macrostate 
TM) or that do not (as when the market is in macrostate TH).  However, the likelihood that 
the market price and true value are equal is much greater than the likelihood that the 
market price and true value diverge. 
 In each case we have systems in different macrostates that vary not in their 
microstates, but in the likelihood of their being in such microstates.  Impressed by this 
fact, I propose that the macrostate of a system is determined not by its microstate, but 
rather by the likelihood of that microstate and the likelihood of every other microstate 
that the system could be in at that time.90  In short, my view is that the macrostate of a 
system at a time is determined by a probability distribution over microstates at that time. 
 To clarify my proposal, let us reconsider the thermodynamics counterexample.  
There are a huge number of microstates consistent with a system’s being in F.  In most of 
these microstates, the molecules of gas are evenly distributed throughout the container, 
but there are some microstates (such as b) in which the molecules are bunched.  The fact 
                                                           
90 Strictly speaking, it is the probability density function over microstates that determines the macrostate, 
since each microstate may have probability zero. 
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that the sum of the probabilities of microstates in which the molecules are evenly 
distributed is much larger than the sum of the probabilities of microstates in which the 
molecules are bunched (microstates like b) is a fact about a probability distribution that 
ranges over those microstates.  In other words, the fact that b is an unlikely sort of 
microstate for the system to be in is a fact about a probability distribution over possible 
microstates.      
 Similarly there are a huge number of microstates that are consistent with a 
system’s being in O.  Some microstates, such as b, are consistent with O as well as F, and 
so the distribution associated with O assigns a positive probability to some of the same as 
the distribution associated with F.  Nevertheless, the distribution associated with O is 
different from the distribution associated with F.  The sum of the probabilities of 
microstates that are like b is much greater according to the probability distribution 
associated with O than according to the distribution associated with F.  This difference in 
the distributions is what grounds the fact that likelihood of the system’s being in a 
microstate such as b is greater when the system is in O than when it is in F.  The fact that 
the probability distribution associated with O is different from the distribution associated 
with F is what makes the difference between a system’s being O and a system’s being F. 
 The evolutionary biology case may be explained in the same way.  The difference 
between our butterfly’s having a high fitness and its having a low fitness involves the 
likelihood of the microphysical details of its life.  If the butterfly’s fitness is high, the 
likelihood of those microphysical details being the sort that they are is lower than if the 
butterfly’s fitness is low.  This is a fact about the difference between the probability 
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distribution that obtains if the butterfly’s fitness is high and the probability distribution 
that obtains if the butterfly’s fitness is low. 
 Finally, the economics case receives the same treatment.  The difference between 
an investment’s having one true value rather than another involves the likelihood of the 
individuals in the market acting in such a way that market price will be that value.  The 
probability distribution over possible microstates that obtains when the system is in TH is 
different from the probability distribution that obtains when the system is in TM.    
 My proposal not only explains the counterexamples to MS, but also accounts for 
the sorts of cases that made MS seem initially plausible.  Though it is possible for two 
different distributions to assign the same microstate a non-zero likelihood, it is also 
possible for there to be only one distribution that assigns some microstate a non-zero 
likelihood.  In such cases it will seem that that microstate does determine the system’s 
macrostate, since that microstate is assigned a non-zero likelihood by only one 
probability distribution. The distributions I posit gives us the best of both worlds: they tie 
macrostates and microstates together so that a system’s microstate plays a role in the 
determination of its macrostate, but not so tightly that a given microstate is consistent 
with only one macrostate.   
 I have argued that various possible microstates have objective non-zero chances 
of obtaining now- including some microstates that do not obtain now.  Even the 
microstate that actually obtains now may now have a chance less than one of obtaining 
now. I call the chances I posit “synchronic” because they are chances (with non-extremal 
values) at a time that some outcome obtains at that very same time.  That there are 
synchronic chances is, as far as I can see, the best explanation for both the sorts of cases 
  98 
that suggest MS and the counterexamples to it. For instance, if there is no synchronic 
probability distribution, then there is no objective sense in which b is a more likely sort of 
microstate when the system is in F than when it is in O.  Without the synchronic 
distribution, the only objective value of the chance of b is one both when the system is in 
F and when it is in O.  
 Synchronic chances no doubt seem strange since they behave so differently from 
more familiar distributions.  We are used to chances that have non-extremal values now 
only if they are about outcomes obtaining in the future.91  Here are a few considerations 
that (hopefully) make the synchronic distribution seem less mysterious. 
 First, one might worry that there is something mathematically inconsistent about 
the synchronic distribution.  Consider the probability distribution associated with the 
chances described by fundamental physics (which I call “micro-chances”).  The value of 
the unconditional micro-chance at t1 that some microstate “a” obtains at t1 is equal to the 
value of the conditional micro-chance of a conditional on (among other things) the entire 
history of the world up to and including t1.92  So, if a obtains at t1, then the unconditional 
chance at t1 of a is equal to the chance of a conditional on (among other things) a.93 But 
it is just a mathematical fact that the conditional chance of a given a is one, and so the 
value of the unconditional chance at t1 of a at t1 must be one.  To avoid contradiction the 
                                                           
91 Of course, the fact that the world has the synchronic distribution that I posit does not mean that it does 
not also have other distributions with which we are more familiar.  The existence of a synchronic 
distribution is, for example, consistent with the existence of the micro-chance distribution referred to by 
fundamental physics.   
 
92 According to some philosophers (such as Lewis), this is how chance distributions in general behave, not 
just the micro-chance distribution.  Of course, that is precisely what I deny.   
 
93 If “a” doesn’t obtain now, and t1 and t2 are both now, then the unconditional chance of a is equal to the 
conditional chance of a given (among other things) not a. 
  99 
value of an unconditional synchronic chance of some microstate must not equal the value 
of the conditional chance of that microstate given the entire history of the world.  But, no 
mathematical fact compels the value of an unconditional synchronic chance to equal a 
chance conditional on the history of the world. 
 Of course, it is little comfort that synchronic chances are mathematically 
consistent if they are nonetheless metaphysically inconsistent.  There may seem to be 
some metaphysical tension between its being true that a obtains now (or there being a 
“fact of the matter” about whether a obtains now), and the chance now of a now being 
non-maximal.  But while there is an epistemic tension between believing that a obtains 
now and believing the chance now of a now to be non-maximal, there is no metaphysical 
tension.  To be convinced, consider the proposition that the Panthers will win the Super 
Bowl next year.  If that proposition is true, then it is true right now, even though the 
chance right now that the Panthers will win the Super Bowl next year is (unfortunately) 
very low.  There is no inconsistency, then, between a proposition being now true (or there 
now being some fact of the matter now about a state of affairs) and the chance now of 
that proposition (or that state of affairs) being non-maximal. 
 Third, one might suspect that there is something conceptually puzzling about the 
synchronic distribution.  Since I advocate a non-reductive theory of chance, I cannot 
explain what a synchronic chance is by reducing it to some other, less puzzling, member 
of our ontology.  The best way to understand synchronic chances is by attending to the 
unique explanatory role that they play.  The chances expressed by the synchronic 
distribution associated with F, for example, are explanations of the fact that some 
particular microstate obtains.  These explanations omit information about past 
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microstates and their evolutions, but include information about the tendency of gases to 
be in states in which the particles are evenly dispersed.  Conversely, chances expressed 
by the micro-chance distribution provide explanations that focus exclusively on the 
evolution of past microstates.  While it is clear that there are some contexts in which the 
latter explanation is appropriate, it should be equally clear that there are contexts in 
which the former explanation is appropriate.  If a researcher wants to know why, in 
general, five-liter gases are in dispersed microstates, the chances expressed by the 
synchronic distribution provide him with that explanation in a way that the value of the 
micro-chance simply cannot.   
 Admittedly, this analysis does not dissolve any conceptual worries surrounding 
the synchronic distribution.  After all, the micro-chance explanation may be thought of as 
a causal explanation, but the synchronic explanation is not a causal explanation and some 
philosophers reject the existence of non-causal explanations.  That said, there seems to be 
a unique explanatory role that synchronic chances play, and if this explanatory role is 
non-causal, so much the worse for the view that all scientific explanations are causal.   
 
4.7.  The Laplacean Argument 
 In normal conversational contexts we casually refer to the chance of rain, to the 
chance that our children will turn out like Mom, and to the chance that our pocket jacks 
will crack our opponent’s queens in our weekly Texas Hold ‘Em poker game. Pre-
theoretically, we speak as if there are (non-extremal) chances other than those referred to 
by fundamental physics.  Let’s call these chances “macro-chances”.   
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 We not only describe such chances, but also use them for explanation.  We might 
cite the low probability that I will win the lottery after having bought only one ticket as 
an explanation for my losing the lottery, or the high probability that I will recover from 
an infection after having taken penicillin as an explanation for my recovery.  
Furthermore, we feel comfortable appealing to macro-chances in spite of our ignorance 
of the values of micro-chances (or our opinions about whether any micro-chances have 
non-extremal values at all).  For example, our practice of using a coin flip to create a 
situation with two equally possible outcomes was as prominent when we believed our 
world to be fundamentally deterministic (and so believed every micro-chance to have an 
extremal value) as it is today.  
 Despite whatever pre-theoretic appeal there may be to the claim that there are 
objective macro-chances that are importantly independent from micro-chances, there is a 
powerful and persuasive argument that macro-chances must either be mere subjective 
expressions of our ignorance or, if they are objective and non-extremal, must reduce to 
micro-chances.  This argument relies heavily on the Principal Principle.94  Objective 
chances are supposed to constrain rational credences.  But, if there were a being who 
knew both the micro-chance and the macro-chance of some proposition, then if the value 
of those chances ever conflict he should form his expectations in light of the value of the 
micro-chance rather than the macro-chance.  Accordingly, macro-chances must either not 
be objective (and so do not constrain our rational credence) or must never conflict with 
                                                           
94 For a discussion of the Principal Principle, see Chapters 2 and 3. 
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(and in this sense reduce to) micro-chances.  I’ll call this argument “Laplacean” since it is 
inspired by Laplace’s famous thought experiment.95 
 For the Laplacean argument to be valid, the Laplacean being must know the 
micro-chance and macro-chance of the very same state.  But micro-chances are the 
chances of microstates and macro-chances are the chances of macrostates.  Without some 
further premise, there is no conflict between a being using micro-chances to form 
expectations about microstates and his using macro-chances to form expectations about 
macro-states (no matter how the values of these chances relate).   
 MS is precisely the sort of assumption that the Laplacean argument requires.  If 
MS is true, then each microstate corresponds to exactly one macrostate.  There is no 
reason why the Laplacean being could not, in principle, know the details of this 
correspondence and so deduce the chances of the macrostates from his knowledge of the 
micro-chances of microstates.  So the Laplacean argument relies on MS to move from the 
being’s knowledge of the micro-chances of some future microstates to his knowledge of 
the chance of some future macrostate. 
 If macrostates supervene not on microstates, but on a synchronic distribution over 
microstates, then the above version of the Laplacean argument is unsuccessful.  Since the 
synchronic distribution over microstates is underdetermined by the values of the micro-
chances, our being cannot deduce the synchronic distribution that holds at a particular 
time from his knowledge of the micro-chances, and so he cannot deduce the chances of 
the macrostates from the micro-chances of the microstates. 
 Still, it might seem that one can generate a version of the Laplacean argument 
even if MS is replaced.  On my view, knowledge of a system’s microstate can help the 
                                                           
95 Laplace (1814) 
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agent to confirm the synchronic probability of that microstate, and thus that system’s 
macrostate.  Furthermore, some microstates may be assigned a positive probability by 
only one distribution, and so a system’s microstate can entail its macrostate.  Suppose 
that an agent is wondering now whether some system will be in macrostate M at some 
future time t.  She is certain that the macro-chance of M now is .5, but she is also certain 
that the microstate that the system will be in at t entails M.  Her rational credence in M 
should, thus, be one now and so she should not set her credence in accord with the 
macro-chance now.  So it seems that a version of the Laplacean argument survives even 
if MS does not. 
 Let’s consider the above argument more carefully.  Objective chance constrains 
rational credence only in cases where an agent has no inadmissible information. There is 
significant philosophical dispute about what “inadmissibility” amounts to, and I have 
offered my account of admissibility above.96   But even if one rejects my account of 
admissibility, we need attend only to canonical examples of it for our current purpose.  
Imagine we are deciding what ice cream flavor to have for dessert by flipping a coin 
twice.97  We will have vanilla if and only if the coin lands heads twice in a row.  If we 
know that the coin is fair and we do not know any inadmissible information, then our 
credence should be .5 that the chance that we will have vanilla ice cream after that the 
first flip will be .5.  But if instead we discover that we will have vanilla ice cream in the 
future through (for instance) a conversation with a reliable time traveler, then we can use 
this information to infer that the first flip will land heads.  Thus, we should be very 
                                                           
96 See Chapter 2. 
 
97 Ignore, for the moment, any worries about whether the chance of the outcomes of coin flips are 
objective.  If this is hard, imagine an analogous example using your favorite genuinely chancy process 
instead. 
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confident that the chance after the first flip that we will have vanilla ice cream is .5.  This 
is a case in which the objective chance of an outcome does not equal our rational 
credence in it, but it is not an example of a violation of the purported relationship 
between objective chance and rational credence.  To put it in Lewis’ terms, the 
information we have from the time traveler is inadmissible because it is information 
about the outcome of a chance that does not “go by way of” the value of that chance.   
 With this rough notion of inadmissibility in hand, we can return to the question of 
whether there is a successful version of the Laplacean argument consistent with my view.  
If macrostates are determined by a synchronic probability distribution, then wondering 
now whether a system will be in M at t is equivalent to wondering now what the 
synchronic chance will be at t of every particular microstate that obtains at t.  This is 
analogous to wondering what the chance will be after the first flip that we will have 
vanilla ice cream.  To continue the analogy, if an agent knows what microstate will 
obtain at t, then she knows the outcome of the synchronic chances at t.  Furthermore, 
because of how we imagined the case, if she knows the outcome of the synchronic chance 
at t then she may infer that the synchronic distribution associated with M obtains at t.  
This is analogous to deducing from the fact that we will have vanilla ice cream that the 
chance after the first flip that we will have vanilla ice cream is .5.  Just as we consider the 
information that we will have vanilla ice cream to be inadmissible in the coin flip case, so 
too should we consider the information that the system is in a particular microstate at t 
inadmissible in the synchronic chance case, since it is information about an outcome of a 
synchronic chance that does not go by way of that chance.  On the picture I endorse, then, 
the Laplacean argument has no purchase since (because he has inadmissible information) 
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the Laplacean being is not obliged to set his credence in accord with the macro-chances 
even if they are objective.98    
 Of course, the fact that replacing MS undercuts the Laplacean argument may be 
seen as a cost of abandoning MS rather than a benefit.  (There’s no accounting for taste.)  
Personally, I am impressed by the explanatory success of macro-chances in sciences like 
thermodynamics, biology, and economics and am inclined to think that this success 
points toward their objectivity regardless of whether such macro-chances are reducible to 
micro-chances.  At the very least, if MS is false then one of the most attractive reasons 
for skepticism about the objectivity and independence of macro-chances is undermined.      
                                                           
98 Lest it seem that my treatment of inadmissibility is too soft on macro-chances, notice that (if macrostates 
supervene on synchronic distributions) there may also be cases in which knowledge of macro-chances 
provides more information than the micro-chances about the microstate of a system.  In such cases, 
inadmissibility protects the objectivity of micro-chances from the Laplacean argument in exactly the same 
way that it protects the objectivity of macro-chances.    
Chapter 5. The Non-Reductive Theory Revisited 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 Let’s take stock of the dialectic thus far.  In Chapter 1, I argued that two 
prominent types of reductive theories of chance face prima facie challenges.  Humean 
frequency theories face the undermining problem, causal propensity theories seem unable 
to accommodate objective synchronic chances, and neither seem to explain the PP.  I then 
sketched my non-reductive theory of chance and argued that it does not face the 
undermining problem nor does it have any difficulty accommodating objective 
synchronic chances.  Chapter 1 is an argument for a conditional:  if my non-reductive 
theory of chance can explain the Principal Principle and there are objective synchronic 
chances, then my non-reductive theory has prima facie advantages over its reductive 
competitors.  The arguments in Chapters 2-4 are supposed to secure the antecedent of that 
conditional.  I conclude this dissertation by discussing the relationship between my non-
reductive theory and a theory of explanation, raising some questions about objective 
synchronic chance, and considering whether my non-reductive theory meets three well-
known conditions of adequacy.   
 
5.2. Probabilistic Explanation 
 In Chapter 3, I suggested that we stipulate, rather than argue, that chance values 
are unique real numbers.  On my view, then, objective chances are uniquely real-valued 
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theoretical quantities that are essentially explanations of their outcomes.  In Chapter 1, I 
noted that inertial mass plays an explanatory role in Newtonian physics, and I claimed 
that it plays this role contingently.  But that claim is controversial.  Philosophers who 
deny that statements of laws of nature are contingently true, or who hold that an essential 
property of inertial mass is that it is equal to force over acceleration, deny that there are 
metaphysically possible worlds in which bodies have inertial masses that do not obey 
Newton’s second law of motion.  Such philosophers might hold that inertial mass plays 
its explanatory role essentially; a body’s inertial mass m explains the same relationship 
(type) between the force acting on it and its rate of acceleration in the actual world that it 
explains in every metaphysically possible world.  While I doubt that inertial mass does 
play its explanatory role essentially, a theory of chance should not settle the issue.  So, 
let’s suppose that inertial masses, like objective chances, are uniquely real-valued 
objective theoretical quantities that play their explanatory role essentially. 
 Now we seem to have a problem for my non-reductive theory.  Suppose that my 
non-reductive theory explains the PP; it explains why, so long as we have no 
inadmissible information, our rational credence in some outcome is equal to what we 
believe to be that outcome’s chance.  This explanation must follow from the fact that 
objective chances are uniquely real-valued theoretical quantities that essentially explain 
their outcomes.  But inertial masses are uniquely real-valued theoretical quantities that 
essentially explain relationships between forces and accelerations.   So, if my non-
reductive theory explains why chances obey the PP, it must also “explain” why inertial 
masses obey the following analogue of the PP: so long as we have no inadmissible 
information, our rational credence that some particular relationship between force and 
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acceleration obtains is equal to what we believe to be the inertial mass value that obtains.  
But this analogue of the PP is false and so cannot be explained.  Thus, my non-reductive 
theory does not explain the Principal Principle.          
 While I do not think that this objection is successful, it is nevertheless instructive.  
The derivation of the PP in Chapter 3 requires CBCE and CEM.  Both of these premises 
are claims about the conditions under which chance hypotheses are confirmed.  Could 
there be analogues of CBCE and CEM that apply to the conditions under which inertial 
mass hypotheses are confirmed?  No.  CBCE and CEM hold in virtue of the unique 
explanatory character of objective chance.  For instance, CBCE is true (in part) because 
higher chance values (all other things being equal) make for better explanations than do 
lower chance values.  Higher inertial mass values do not (all other things being equal) 
make for better explanations than do lower inertial values, and so no analogue of CBCE 
is true of inertial mass.  The PP holds, in part, because objective chance explanations do 
not behave in the same way that other kinds of explanations do. 
 Doesn’t this response merely relocate the problem?  Now I seem committed to the 
view that objective chances are essentially a special kind of explanation.  To make the 
issue as stark as possible, call this kind of explanation “probabilistic”.  My arguments for 
the non-reductive theory require that probabilistic explanations have three particular 
characteristics.  First, objective real-valued theoretical quantities must be able to provide 
probabilistic explanations.  Second, that objective chances are probabilistic explanations 
must (when combined with a theory of abduction) entail that CBCE and CEM are true.  
Third, since I maintain that objective synchronic chances are non-causal explanations, 
probabilistic explanation must not be a kind of causal explanation (though I can allow 
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that some probabilistic explanations are causal and vice versa).  But, if chance facts 
neither reduce to nor supervene on any non-chance facts, it is extremely implausible that 
there is a theory of probabilistic explanation that respects all three of these features yet 
makes no irreducible reference to chance facts.           
 I agree that no such theory of probabilistic explanation will be forthcoming.  After 
all, my claim that objective chances are essentially (probabilistic) explanations is 
explicitly not an attempt to reduce chance facts to non-chance facts.  To complain that 
probabilistic explanation is an irreducibly chancy notion is merely to complain that my 
non-reductive theory is non-reductive. 
 Still, I think that there is a legitimate worry in the vicinity.  Explaining the PP is a 
burden on theories of chance because the PP describes a feature that is unique to 
objective chance.  My non-reductive theory seems to explain this unique feature of 
objective chance at the cost of leaving unexplained a further unique feature of objective 
chance: that chances are probabilistic explanations. 
 That my non-reductive theory faces this worry is not surprising.  Non-reductive 
theories, like all theories of chance, must admit that objective chances are unique.  No 
matter where a non-reductive theorist locates the source of this uniqueness, she must 
admit that it can have no (non-chancy) explanation.  Why not, then, stipulate that 
objective chances obey the PP, and dispense with Chapters 2 and 3?  My answer is that 
not all explanatory lacunas are created equally.  It seems more mysterious to me that 
objective chances have a unique relationship to our beliefs than that objective chances 
provide a unique kind of explanation.  It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to settle 
whether the unique explanatory role that objective chance plays is mysterious at all, 
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(though this issue is important).  For now, I am content that my non-reductive theory of 
chance (unlike its reductive competitors) explains a mysterious feature of objective 
chance, even though it does not (nor could it) explain every unique feature of objective 
chance.    
 
5.3.  Synchronic Chances 
 Are there objective synchronic chances?  In Chapter 4, I argued that the existence 
of objective synchronic chances is required by the correct theory of the relationship 
between the microstates and macrostates of physical systems.  To the extent that this 
argument is successful, there seem to be objective synchronic chances.  But this argument 
left unanswered a number questions about objective synchronic chances.  I’ll briefly 
discuss what I take to be the most interesting of these, though I won’t attempt to provide 
any answers.  
 If there are objective synchronic chances, then there are at least two distinct 
chance distributions that obtain at a particular time:  the micro-chance distribution and a 
synchronic chance distribution.  How are these two related?  On the one hand, the 
synchronic chance distribution at a time obviously does not supervene on the micro-
chance distribution at that time, nor vice versa.  On the other hand, it seems that micro-
chances stand in an important relationship to synchronic chances, since had the 
fundamental physical laws been different (and so had the micro-chances at some earlier 
time been different), the synchronic chances would have been different.99   
                                                           
99 Suppose, for example, that the fundamental laws guaranteed that gas particles never bunch.  It seems, 
then, that the synchronic chance of microstate b in the gas case would have been much different.  
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 Furthermore, one synchronic chance distribution will likely not do the job.  We 
require one synchronic chance distribution to associate with thermodynamic properties, a 
second synchronic distribution to associate with biological properties, and so on.  This is 
not a reductio of objective synchronic chances; if multiple synchronic probability 
distributions are what our best scientific and philosophical theories require, then so be it.  
But, how are these various synchronic probability distributions related to one another?   
 Answers to these questions might help answer other related questions about the 
relationship between objective chances, laws of nature, and natural kinds.  Further 
philosophical research into the nature of objective synchronic chance may have 
implications not only for a non-reductive theory of chance and theories of chances in 
general, but also for a wide range of issues that arise in metaphysics and philosophy of 
science. 
 
5.4.  Ascertainability, Applicability, and Admissibility 
 Is there some decisive argument against a non-reductive theory that I have not yet 
considered?  Perhaps, but I do not think it is to be found among the problems that have 
traditionally plagued theories of chance.  Wesley Salmon famously argued that any 
interpretation of the probability calculus, including theories of objective chance, must 
meet three conditions of adequacy:  ascertainability, applicability, and admissibility.100  A 
thorough defense of my non-reductive theory would involve demonstrating that it can 
meet each of these, and that is more than I will do here.  However, I end this dissertation 
with a brief look at my non-reductive theory’s prospects for satisfying Salmon’s three 
conditions.      
                                                           
100 Salmon (1967) 
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 Let’s start with ascertainability.  Ascertainability requires that there be some 
method by which we may, at least in principle, come to learn the values of objective 
chances.  On my view, we ascertain chance values from the values of actual relative 
frequencies via inference to the best explanation.  Justifying abduction is a difficult but 
familiar task, and poses no special problem for a non-reductive theorist.  So long as 
abduction can be justified and there are (non-causal) probabilistic explanations, my non-
reductive theory meets the ascertainability condition.   
 What about applicability?  The applicability condition is roughly that a theory of 
chance be consistent with the myriad of ways in which we use chances in our everyday 
lives and our best scientific theories.  Theories of objective chance typically run afoul of 
the applicability condition by failing to respect either that chances constrain rational 
credences or that chances apply to singular events.  I have already argued that my non-
reductive theory explains the PP, but does it allow that objective chances apply to 
singular events?  The answer seems to be yes, since objective chances are probabilistic 
explanations of singular events.    
 Furthermore, my non-reductive theory does not suffer from a reference class 
problem.  Reference class problems arise when the particular chance value a theory 
assigns to a singular event varies depending on how that event is characterized, but no 
characterization stands out as privileged.  While this is a serious problem, it only plagues 
reductive theories of chance.101  If the particular chance value of a singular event depends 
on how it is characterized, then facts about the objective chance value of that event 
privilege a characterization of that event.  Of course, reductive theories cannot appeal to 
                                                           
101 Alan Hájek (2007) makes this point, though he doubts that non-reductive theories can explain the 
Principal Principle. 
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such chance facts on threat of vicious circularity.  But non-reductive theories are not 
similarly constrained.  Whatever worries my non-reductive theory might face, the 
reference class problem is not among them. 
 Lastly, consider admissibility.  An objective theory of chance is admissible if and 
only if it respects all the mathematical relationships between probabilities entailed by the 
probability calculus.  Any theory that explains the Principal Principle satisfies this 
condition, since rational credences obey the probability calculus.  So, to the extent that 
my non-reductive theory explains the Principal Principle, it satisfies admissibility. 
 My non-reductive theory, then, seems to satisfy ascertainability, applicability, and 
admissibility.  Of course, it might fail to meet one of these conditions for some reason I 
have not yet considered.  And, once again, my non-reductive theory might face some 
further objective even if it meets all three conditions of adequacy and explains the 
Principal Principle.  A full defense of my non-reductive theory requires a more thorough 
investigation into these possibilities.  More work must be done, then, to establish that my 
non-reductive theory is true.  However, this dissertation should dispel the myth that non-
reductive theories are non-starters.  My non-reductive theory provides illuminating 
answers to questions about the nature of chance and has prima facie advantages over its 
reductive competitors   
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